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ARTICLE
BRINGING BALANCE TO
INDIAN GAMING
MATTHEW L. M. FLETCHER*
This Article argues that the national debate on Indian gaming wrongly
focuses on the issue of off-reservation gaming and other symptoms of the cur-
rent imbalance in Indian gaming law, rather than addressing the fundamental
reason for the imbalance. The Article first describes the history of Indian
gaming law that led to Congress's enactment of the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act ("IGRA") in 1988 and explains the delicate balance that the IGRA
created between state and tribal interests. The author suggests that the Su-
preme Court's Seminole Tribe decision in 1996 ruptured this balance by in-
validating the IGRA provision that extended federal jurisdiction to claims
against states for failure to negotiate gaming compacts with tribes in good
faith. As a result of the imbalance, states have been able to impose revenue-
sharing agreements of questionable legality and fairness on tribes. This, in
turn, has led tribes to pursue expanded gaming opportunities off-reservation
and to invoke a procedure of uncertain validity that allows the Secretary of
the Interior to prescribe gaming compacts between tribes and states. The Ar-
ticle proposes a legislative fix designed to restore the intended balance of the
IGRA in a politically salable manner. The primary elements of the proposal
are ratification of all existing revenue sharing agreements to which the con-
cerned tribes consent, a requirement that all future gaming compacts include
revenue sharing, and ratification of the Secretary's procedure for prescribing
fair gaming compacts.
The brewing national backlash against off-reservation Indian gaming
may result in amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"
or "the Act") t that would prohibit off-reservation gaming. The backlash
has resulted from misconceptions that Indian tribes, their "attack-dog"
lobbyists,2 and their "shady" gaming management and development com-
panies3 could impose Vegas-style casino operations in Middle American
- Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law, and Director, Michi-
gan State University Indigenous Law and Policy Center. J.D., University of Michigan Law
School, 1997; B.A., University of Michigan, 1994. Appellate Judge, Hoopa Valley Tribe,
Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, and Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians.
Enrolled Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. The author wishes
to thank Kristen Burge, Kirsten Carlson, Brian Kalt, Del Laverdure, John Petoskey, Bill
Rice, Angela Riley, Wenona Singel, Alex Skibine, and Kevin Washburn for their comments
on earlier versions of this Article.
'Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
2 See John Cochran, Scrutiny on Tribes Keeps Stakes High, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 27,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1939588.
1 See, e.g., M. Neil Browne et al., The Role of Ethics in Regulatory Discourse: Can
Market Failure Justify the Regulation of Casinio Gaming?, 78 NEB. L. REv. 37, 51-52 (1999)
(footnotes omitted).
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communities that do not want them. The resulting debates over the amend-
ments to the Act distract policymakers from the real imbalance in Indian
gaming-the imbalance created by the stronger bargaining position of
state governments relative to Indian tribes. This imbalance allows state
governments to impose revenue sharing agreements of dubious legal va-
lidity on Indian tribes in exchange for the right to commence gaming op-
erations. Indian tribes, in response to their weak bargaining position, have
sought off-reservation opportunities to expand the size of a revenue pie
that is shrinking as a result of these revenue-sharing agreements.
The agenda of the 109th Congress included hearings on off-reservation
gaming, tribal lobbying matters, taking of land into trust for gaming pur-
poses, and the regulation of Indian gaming.4 All of these issues have legs
when it comes to politics-they appear in the national news and inspire a
substantial amount of passionate democratic debate.'
One could make a strong case that the congressional agenda is a re-
sult of a national backlash against Indian gaming.6 Members of both houses
4 See generally Oversight Hearing Before the S. Indian Affairs Comm. on In re Tribal
Lobbying Matters, 109th Cong. (2005); Oversight Hearing on the Second Discussion Draft
of Legis. Regarding Off-Reservation Indian Gaming Before the H. Resources Comm., 109th
Cong., (2005); Oversight Hearing on Draft Legis. to Amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act to Restrict Off-Reservation Gaming, and for other purposes Before the H. Resources
Comm., 109th Cong. (2005).
5 See generally STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R. L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING
AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 11-13 (2005) (discussing the con-
troversies of Indian gaming); Peter Roper, Off-Reservation Casinos Shock Congress,
PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (CoLo.), Sept. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15178554; Jodi
Rave, Governors: Casinos Off Reservation Top Concern, MISSOULIAN (MONT.), Mar. 31,
2005, at B I, available at 2005 WLNR 6020534 (discussing off-reservation gaming); Susan
Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Norton Ex-Aides Clash on Lobbyist's Influence; Lawyer
Says He Accused Griles of Aiding Abramoff, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2005, at A19, available
at 2005 WLNR 17731764 (discussing tribal lobbying); Suzanne Gamboa, Lobbyists Di-
verted Millions from Tribes; McCain-asks Justice to Investigate the Trail of Billing, Money,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 23, 2005, at 14A, available at 2005 WLNR 9901208 (dis-
cussing tribal lobbying); Tu-Uyen Tran, Council Gives Lukewarm Support; Vote Set for
Monday, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Oct. 11, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 16434974
(discussing fee-to-trust-matters); John Stearns & Suzanne Struglinski, McCain Aims to
Strengthen Oversight of Tribal Gambling, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sept. 22, 2005, at C3, available
at 2005 WLNR 15438951 (discussing Indian gaming regulation and Colorado River Indian
Tribes v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 383 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005), where the
court invalidated class III gaming regulations implemented by the National Indian Gaming
Commission).6 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S13389, S13390 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement'of
Sen. McCain) (noting a "backlash against Indian gaming generally"). See generally Over-
sight Hearing Before the S. Indian Affairs Comm. on the Regulation of Indian Gaming,
109th Cong. 12-13 (2005) (Statement of Kathryn R. L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light) ("At
times, the claims made by tribal gaming's opponents may ... set the tone of the public
conversation about Indian gaming ... [and] the agenda for public policy."), available at
http://indian.senate.gov/2005hrgs/042705hrg/rand.pdf [hereinafter Rand & Light Testi-
mony]; The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Seminole v. Florida on
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 104th Cong. 104-513 (1996) (statement of
Franklin Ducheneaux) (noting "the distortion of [the right of Indian tribes to game] by the
press and opponents of Indian gaming") [hereinafter Ducheneux Testimony].
[Vol. 44
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of Congress have introduced legislation intending to limit off-reservation
gaming, limit the taking of lands into trust for gaming purposes, expand
regulation of Indian gaming, and increase restrictions on Indian lobbying
activities. 7 The current climate on Capitol Hill in relation to Indian gam-
ing is one of reform and may reflect the vast changes and growth in the
Indian gaming industry since 1988.8
At the time of the enactment of IGRA in 1988, Senator McCain stated,
"It is with great reluctance that I am supporting [IGRA]."9 He lamented
that "[ltribes never banded together and offered their own gaming pro-
posal.""° When Senator McCain introduced his own legislation, more sup-
portive of tribal sovereignty, he stated, "[u]nfortunately, I received no more
than a handful of letters supporting this measure; only more calls for 'no
legislation.' I believe Tribes and tribal organizations share part of the burden
for the direction that Indian gaming legislation has taken.""
Senator McCain's "reluctant" support for IGRA underscores the re-
alities of national politics and Indian affairs. Some legislation is "inevi-
table," despite efforts by tribes to call for "no legislation."'2
Tribes and states are in need of a simple legislative fix that benefits
both sides and cuts to the heart of the imbalance in IGRA. The solution
to these salient political issues is not piecemeal legislative efforts to rem-
edy the alleged problems with Indian gaming. These problems are symp-
toms of an imbalance in the overarching federal statutory scheme. The Act
originally created a balanced and careful relationship between Indian
tribes-and to a lesser extent, the federal government-and the various
states."3 The crux of that statutory scheme was a congressional waiver of
7 See, e.g., To Amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to Limit Casino Expansion,
H.R. 3431, 109th Cong. (2005) (restricting off-reservation gaming and increasing state
authority to restrict Indian gaming); Common Sense Indian Gambling Reform Act, H.R.
2353, 109th Cong. (2005) (increasing Indian gaming regulation, limiting off-reservation
gaming, increasing regulation of tribal lobbying, and increasing state authority over Indian
gaming); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments of 2005, S. 2078, 109th Cong. (2005)
(expanding the National Indian Gaming Commission's regulatory authority and constrict-
ing the legal authority for off-reservation gaming expansion); To Amend the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act to Modify a Provision Relating to the Locations in Which Class III
Gaming is Lawful, S. 1518, 109th Cong. (2005) (restricting lands where Indian gaming is
authorized); National Indian Gaming Commission Accountability Act of 2005, S. 1295,
109th Cong. (2005) (increasing federal regulation of Indian gaming).
8 151 CONG. REC. at S 13390 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain).
9S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 33 (1988)
10 1d
.
1Id.
121d.
"3 See Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R. L. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal
Sovereignty: Three Frameworks for Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV.
L.J. 262, 271-73 (2004) (describing the intent of Congress to balance the interests of the
three sovereigns); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on Indian Reservations: Defining the
Trustee's Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 129-32
(1997) (describing the policy considerations of the Act); Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Eco-
nomic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 49 (1997) ("In the end, the 1988 Indian Gaming
2007]
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state sovereign immunity that allowed Indian tribes to sue the states and
force their governors to negotiate with tribes over gaming compacts. 4
The Supreme Court, however, in Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida,5
obliterated that balance in favor of the states. 6 In Seminole Tribe, the Court
ruled that the congressional waiver of state immunity was invalid under
the Eleventh Amendment, "significantly limiting the bargaining power of
Indian tribes."' 7
Indian tribes and the federal government took several steps in order
to alleviate the negative impact of Seminole Tribe on Indian gaming. In-
dian tribes and the states began to negotiate broader revenue sharing agree-
ments, 8 a process some have labeled extortion of Indian tribes by states. 9
Meanwhile, the federal government, through the Secretary of the Interior,
proposed an administrative fix to the Seminole Tribe problem that would
allow the Secretary to promulgate class III gaming procedures for tribes
that do not have the opportunity to negotiate a gaming compact.2 °
The fundamental cause of the disputes between tribes, tribal con-
stituents, states, state constituents, private economic interests, and the fed-
eral government is the imbalance in the IGRA brought about by Seminole
Tribe. The congressional agenda, as evidenced by the Senate Commit-
tee's hearing schedule and the subject matter of the various bills being
debated, ignores the key issue of whether revenue sharing agreements con-
tained in gaming compacts are valid in accordance with IGRA.2' These
Regulatory Act represented a political compromise made to protect the same state regula-
tory interests that the Supreme Court had found unpersuasive in Cabazon, while still pre-
serving gaming as a means of tribal economic development, thus alleviating the financial
burden that the tribes place on the federal government.") (footnote omitted); Franklin
Ducheneaux & Peter S. Taylor, Tribal Sovereignty and the Powers of the National Indian
Gaming Commission 26-32 (describing the legislative negotiation and balancing leading
up to the enactment of IGRA) (on file with author).
'4 See 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(d)(7) (2000), invalidated by Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla.,
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
15 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
16 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 49-50; Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating
the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 451, 452 (2003); Light & Rand, supra note 13, at 274; Steven
Andrew Light et al., Spreading the Wealth: Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agree-
ments, 80 N.D. L. REV. 657, 664-65 (2004); Skibine, supra note 13, at 132-33; Wambdi
Awanwicake Wastewin, Case Comment, Federal Courts-Indians: The Eleventh Amend-
ment and Seminole Tribe: Reinvigorating the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity, 73
N.D. L. REV. 517, 540 (1997).
11 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
'8 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 86-87; Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Prob-
lems in Indian Gaming, I Wyo. L. REV. 427, 440-41 (2001) [hereinafter Washburn, Recur-
ring Problems]; Kevin K. Washburn, A.B.A. CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INDIAN
GAMING: A PRIMER ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN GAMING, THE NIGC AND SEVERAL
IMPORTANT UNRESOLVED ISSUES (2002).
'9 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
20 See Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 FED. REG. 17,535 (Apr. 12, 1999) (codified as
25 C.F.R. pt. 291 (2004)).
21 See generally In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003) (up-
holding the validity of California tribal-state gaming compact revenue sharing provisions);
[Vol. 44
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revenue sharing agreements are the creaky bridge between the states and
the tribes that operates as the de facto Seminole Tribe fix. The critical weak-
ness of these agreements is their questionable validity in the light of the
IGRA's prohibition on state taxation of Indian gaming revenues.2 2 Legal
commentators have proposed numerous legislative fixes that would give
the upper hand in Indian gaming compact negotiations to the states 23 or to
the tribes,2 4 or that propose litigation strategies designed to assist the tribes.
2 5
These proposals are neither salable nor workable in the real world.
Henry Buffalo & Robert Miller, Commentary, Spreading the Wealth: Indian Gaming and
Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. REV. 681, 689 (2004) ("And irrespective of what
the Ninth Circuit has said, I still believe that the law prohibits revenue sharing agree-
ments."); Gatsby Contreras, Note, Exclusivity Agreements in Tribal-State Compacts: Mu-
tual Benefit Revenue-Sharing or Illegal State Taxation, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 487,
490 (2003) ("Although states and tribes continue to enter into these agreements with the
approval of the Department of the Interior, substantial questions remain as to whether these
agreements are valid revenue-sharing or illegal state taxation under the IGRA."); Katie
Eidson, Note, Will States Continue to Provide Exclusivity in Tribal Gaming Compacts or
Will Tribes Bust on the Hand of the State in Order to Expand Indian Gaming, 29 AM. IN-
DIAN L. REV. 319, 325-26 (2004-2005) ("States that wish to engage in revenue sharing from
Indian gaming must formulate their revenue sharing provisions in a manner to bypass the
prohibition against tax impositions."); Lent, supra note 16, at 461 ("The plain statutory
language of IGRA, its legislative history, and relevant case law illustrate that tribal-state
revenue sharing is inappropriate under IGRA."); Rubin Ranat, Note and Comment, Tribal-
State Compacts: Legitimate or Illegal Taxation of Indian Gaming in California?, 26 WHITTIER
L. REV. 953, 980 (2005) ("[I]f Congress clarifies the meaning of IGRA or passes legisla-
tion allowing tribes to bring suit against states, the Court may hold California's Compact
illegal.").
22 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4).
23 See, e.g., Nicolas S. Goldin, Note, Casting a New Light on Tribal Casino Gambling:
Why Congress Should Curtail the Scope of High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 798, 845 (1999); Jason D. Kolkema, Comment, Federal Policy of Indian Gaming on
Newly Acquired Lands and the Threat to State Sovereignty: Retaining Gubernatorial Au-
thority Over the Federal Approval of Gaming on Off-Reservation Sites, 73 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 361, 365 (1996); Edmund F. Leedham III, Note, The Indian Gaming Controversy
in Connecticut: Forging a Balance Between Tribal Sovereignty and State Interests, 13
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 649, 693-94 (1993); Blake A. Watson, Indian Gambling in Ohio:
What Are the Odds?, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 237, 312 (2003).
24 See, e.g., Gary W. Donohue, Note, The Eleventh Amendment: The Supreme Court's
Frustrating Impediment to Sensible Regulation of Indian Gaming, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 295,
324 (1999); Jason Kalish, Note, Do the States Have an Ace in the Hole or Should the In-
dian Call Their Bluff?: Tribes Caught in the Power Struggle Between the Federal Govern-
ment and the States, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1345, 1370-71 (1996); Lent, supra note 16, at 471;
Anthony J. Marks, Note & Comment, A House of Cards: Has the Federal Government
Succeeded in Regulating Indian Gaming?, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 157, 198 (1996);
Brian P. McClatchey, Note, A Whole New Game: Recognizing the Changing Complexion of
Indian Gaming By Removing the "Governor's Veto" for Gaming on "After-Acquired
Lands," 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1227 (2004); Edward P. Sullivan, Note, Reshuffling the
Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1107, 1166 (1995).
25 See Joe Laxague, Note, Indian Gaming and Tribal-State Negotiations: Who Should
Decide the Issue of Bad Faith?, 25 J. LEGIS. 77, 91 (1999); Lent, supra note 16, at 472-73.
Compare Kathleen M. O'Sullivan, Note, What Would John Marshall Say? Does the Fed-
eral Trust Responsibility Protect Tribal Gambling Revenue?, 84 GEO. L.J. 123, 144-50
(1995) (arguing that IGRA meets the federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes and would
likely survive a challenge by tribes based on the trust relationship), with Christian C.
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This Article proposes a legislative solution to IGRA that would vali-
date both the current revenue sharing agreements and the administrative
solution to Seminole Tribe, provide all sides with a significant win-win
opportunity, and avoid interference by federal courts. This Article's legis-
lative proposal is a pragmatic approach to the enormous and controver-
sial issue of Indian gaming. The proposal recognizes the governmental
parties affected by Indian gaming, provides benefits to all of them, and pre-
serves Indian gaming for the long-term by strengthening the operative stat-
ute.
Part I of this Article details the original intent of the Act and describes
the balance created within it. The Act is based on the Supreme Court's
1987 decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.2 6 Work-
ing from this foundation, Congress sought to maintain an equilibrium
between its two constituents, the tribes and the states, in enacting the
statute. However, state governments soon flexed their muscle in heated
response to the decision and to the balancing act Congress implemented
in the legislation.
Part II deals with the Seminole Tribe case and its aftermath, a wob-
bly legislative scheme that altered the balance of bargaining power cho-
sen by Congress and disrupted settled expectations. The decision created
an impetus for tribes to take extensive political measures to preserve and
expand their gaming rights and opportunities while inviting states to seek
expanded economic stakes in tribal government revenue streams. Part II
then draws the connection between an imbalanced IGRA and the current
congressional agenda which seeks to limit and regulate Indian gaming
further than IGRA ever intended. It also describes the legal weaknesses
of the schemes, including revenue sharing agreements, created by states,
tribes, and federal government to further the goals of IGRA in a post-
Seminole Tribe legal and political landscape.
Part III outlines the legislative response Congress should take in or-
der to bring balance to IGRA once again. The legislation proposed in this
Part would ratify all current revenue sharing agreements between tribes
and states contained in gaming compacts, with certain limitations. The
legislation would also validate the Department of the Interior's class III
Gaming Procedures regulations as applied to certain situations.
Part IV analyzes the impacts of the four-part legislative proposal,
concluding that re-balancing IGRA will preserve benefits not only for
tribes, but also for states and local units of government. Moreover, this
rebalancing will make IGRA stronger and more apt to survive the rise
and fall of political tides over time. Finally, Part IV defends this legisla-
Bedortha, Comment, The House Always Wins: A Look at the Federal Government's Role in
Indian Gaming & The Long Search for Autonomy, 6 SCHOLAR 261, 286 (2004) (arguing
that federal and state governments should promote tribal gaming in order to give the fed-
eral trust responsibility "teeth").
26480 U.S. 202 (1987).
[Vol. 44
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tive proposal against tribal and state sovereignty critiques and concludes
that this proposal best satisfies the political interests of both states and
Indian tribes while restoring the inherent balance of the IGRA.
1. BALANCE: CABAZON BAND AND IGRA
As early as the 1960s and into the 1970s, a few Indian tribes in Cali-
fornia, Florida, Maine, New York, and Wisconsin, desperate for tribal gov-
ernment revenue, opened high-stakes bingo parlors. 7 The theory was
straightforward. Federal jurisprudence has long held that state laws have
no force in Indian Country, and state criminal laws that might otherwise
prohibit high stakes bingo would likely not apply to tribally owned and
operated bingo halls.28 Federal officials saw the potential for Indian tribes
to make a significant amount of money in these endeavors.2 9 That money
could be used to reduce Indian dependence on federal appropriations-a
worthwhile political goal. Even local governments often cooperated with
tribes to develop gaming operations."a In the early part of the 1980s, after
27 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 39 (California and Florida); Ray Halbritter &
Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence? The Practical Value and Meaning of
Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 531, 565 (1994) (New York);
Marks, supra note 24, at 158-59 (Florida and Maine); Sidney M. Wolf, Killing the New
Buffalo: State Eleventh Amendment Defense to Enforcement of IGRA Indian Gaming Com-
pacts, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 51, 69 (1995) (Florida and Wisconsin).
28 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a
distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force .... ); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
375-76 (1976) (stating that in the area of state taxation "there has been no satisfactory
authority for taxing Indian reservation lands ....") (citation omitted); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the
States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation."); United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1152); Robert N. Clinton,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18
ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 568 (1976).
29 See Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THO-
MAS L. REV. 769, 772 (1995) ("During this same period, [federal] officials began to realize
the potential economic benefits of tribal gaming operations, and a policy emerged which
supported tribal bingo enterprises as an appropriate means by which tribes could further
their economic self-sufficiency, the economic development of their reservations, and tribal
self-determination.") (footnotes omitted); William E. Horwitz, Note, Scope of Gaming
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 After Rumsey v. Wilson: White Buffalo
or Brown Cow?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 164 n.75 (1996) ("The federal gov-
ernment actively encouraged bingo as a means of economic development by providing ap-
provals of tribal bingo ordinances and even guaranteeing some eight million dollars in
construction loans for bingo facilities." (citing 132 CONG. REC. S 12,017-18 (daily ed. Aug.
15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Andrews))).
30 See, e.g., Worthington v. City Council of City of Rohnert Park, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59,
61 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing agreement between municipality and tribe on gaming);
Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13, at 12 ("Some of these municipal governments began
to approach Indian tribes with proposals involving acquisition of land near the town or city
for transfer to the United States to be held in trust for the tribe. Then, a gaming facility
would be located on the land, providing revenue for the tribes and jobs and economic
2007]
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a series of federal court decisions favoring this exercise of tribal sover-
eignty,3 tribes in other states followed the lead of the gaming tribes.32
Yet, this new source of revenue for the gaming tribes also had nega-
tive consequences. As soon as the bingo halls opened, some state and county
law enforcement officials began to suppress the efforts of these early gaming
tribes.3 3 In 1953, Congress authorized several states, including California
and Wisconsin, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country. 34
Soon other states, such as Florida, took advantage of the statute.35 Those
states with criminal jurisdiction had a much stronger legal claim than
other states in shutting down the tribal bingo halls.36 States that had not
assumed criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country sometimes chose to
regulate gaming by arresting bingo hall patrons as they left the reserva-
tion borders.37 At the same time, as the modest revenue potential of bingo
halls gave way to more lucrative casino-style gaming, replete with slot ma-
chines, poker tables, blackjack, and so on, federal law enforcement agen-
cies began to investigate and prosecute alleged federal criminal violations.3"
growth for the non-Indian community."). Senator McCain neglected to mention this fact
when he stated that "unscrupulous developers" were to blame for increased proposals for
off-reservation gaming. 151 CONG. REC. S13389, S13390 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (state-
ment of Sen. McCain).
1' See Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Oneida
Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981); Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Supp. 245 (D. Conn. 1986). All of these cases found the state
law in question not to apply to Indian reservations because the laws were of a regulatory
nature (see infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text).
32 See S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 5 (1988).
33 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 40 ("[T]he local sheriff threatened to shut down
the [Barona Group of the Capitan Band of Missions lndians]'s bingo operation and arrest
its patrons .... ); Cox, supra note 29, at 770 ("The opening of the Seminole Tribe of Flor-
ida's high stakes bingo hall in 1979 was met with immediate resistance from the Sheriff of
Broward County who threatened to arrest anyone playing bingo at the Tribe's gaming
hall."); Leedham, supra note 23, at 670 ("[T]he Chief State's Attorney, asserting that the
state possessed criminal jurisdiction over the reservation, notified the tribe of his intention
to enforce Connecticut's bingo laws against its enterprise.").34 Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-
1162 (2000); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). See generally
CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC
LAW 280 (1997).
35 See HON. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 27 (4th
ed. 2004).
36 See Sullivan, supra note 24, at 1118-20 (comparing the situations .in Florida and
Wisconsin).37 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 40.38 See Michael Donovan Cox, A.B.A. CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., GAMING
ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT (Apr. 17-18, 1997) [here-
inafter Cox, Gaming Enforcement] (citing United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1950); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dakota, 796
F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986)).
[Vol. 44
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The issue of whether states had jurisdiction to shut down or regulate
Indian bingo halls and casinos reached the Supreme Court in Cabazon
Band.39 The Cabazon and Morongo Band of Mission Indians operated bingo
games on their respective reservations.4 ° The Cabazon Band also operated
poker and other card games.' California, a state with criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country,4 2 and Riverside County sought to enforce the state crimi-
nal code and county ordinances limiting and regulating bingo games.43
Following the text of Public Law 280 and its decision in Bryan v.
Itasca County,4' the Court adopted an analysis that distinguished between
criminal, prohibitory-civil, and regulatory actions by the state.45 The two
operative provisions of Public Law 280 that give rise to this distinction
are sections 2 and 4.46 Section 2 is a grant by Congress to California and
other states of criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country.47 In section 4,
Congress grants a form of civil jurisdiction over Indian Country to Cali-
fornia and other states.48 In Bryan, the Court had held that, consistent
with the Congressional intent of Public Law 280, 49 Section 4 "grant[s]
States jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indi-
ans in state court, but [does] not ... grant general civil regulatory author-
ity."5 In Cabazon Band, the Court recognized that "a grant to States of
general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations would result in
the destruction of tribal institutions and values." 5'
The rule of Bryan, then, is that "it must be determined whether the
law is criminal in nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation un-
der section 2, or civil in nature, and applicable only as it may be relevant
to private civil litigation in state court. '52 The Court noted, however, that
39 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
40 See id. at 204-05.
41 See id. at 205.
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000). In 1953, Congress withdrew federal criminal jurisdic-
tion and extended the criminal jurisdiction of California and a few other states to Indian
Country located within those states. See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 34, at 1. Con-
gress created a mechanism through which other states could assume criminal jurisdiction if
they chose to do so. See id. Congress withdrew that procedure in 1968, but allowed the
nine states who had chosen to assume jurisdiction to retain it. See id. at 2.43 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 205-06 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (1987);
Riverside County Ordinance No. 558; Riverside County Ordinance No. 331).
44426 U.S. 373 (1976).
41 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 210.
46 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (Section 2); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000) (Section 4).
47 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162.48 See 28 U.S.C. § 1360.
41 See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 379 ("The primary concern of Congress in enacting Public
Law 280 that emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the problem of lawless-
ness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law
enforcement.") (citing Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdic-
tion over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 541-42 (1975)).
10 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 208 (citing Bryan, 426 U.S. at 385, 388-90).
1' Id., 480 U.S. at 208.52 Id.
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the test is not a "bright-line rule" 53-the test for criminal behavior is
whether the activity of the tribe violates the public policy of the state in
which the tribe is located.54 Frank Ducheneaux, former counsel on Indian
Affairs to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs from 1973
to 1990, stated the rule as policymakers understand it:
The rationale of the Bryan case, as applied to state regulation of
Indian gaming in the Seminole and Barona case, is quite simple.
It holds that, where a state makes gambling a crime and prohib-
its that activity to all persons or entities within the state, Indian
tribes in that state may not engage in such gambling as a matter
of Federal-Indian law. The corollary, however, is that, where a
state permits gambling as a part of its civil laws, no matter how
stringently it may regulate such activity, Indian tribes in that state
are free to engage in, or permit and regulate[ ], that activity on
their land free of any state regulation. 55
Applying this analysis, the Court concluded that the state and local
laws fit within the civil/regulatory portion of Public Law 280, or Section
4.56 California had not prohibited "all forms of gambling. ' 57 The Court
reviewed the forms of gaming that California had legalized and, weigh-
ing California public policy, concluded that "California regulates rather
than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular."" The Court
concluded that Public Law 280 provided no authority for California to
enforce its bingo and other gaming laws in Indian Country.59
The Court also engaged in a balancing of state, federal, and tribal in-
terests for the purpose of determining whether state laws would be pre-
empted by federal laws and policy.6" Applying this balancing test, the
Court concluded that "[u]nder certain circumstances a State may validly
assert authority over the activities of non-members on a reservation, and
... in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the
on-reservation activities of tribal members."'" California's asserted inter-
est in preventing the infiltration of organized crime into Indian gambling
was insufficient given the lack of any existing criminal involvement in
the enterprises, the federal government's shared interest in preventing organ-
53 Id. at 210.54 Id. at 213.
11 Ducheneaux Testimony, supra note 6, at 170.56 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 211.
1I Id. at 210.
581 d. at 211.
59 See id. at 212.
6 See id. at 214-22.
61 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 215 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1983)).
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ized crime, and its obvious authority to forbid Indian gambling enter-
prises if necessary.62
On the other hand, the Court identified tribal economic development as
an "important" federal interest. 63 The Court relied upon President Reagan's
1983 Statement on Indian policy, which provided that, "[i]t is important
to the concept of self-government that tribes reduce their dependence on
federal funds by providing a greater percentage of the cost of their self-
government."' The Court noted Department of the Interior efforts to pro-
mote tribal bingo operations, 65 including the making of "grants and ...
guarantee[ing] loans for the purpose of constructing bingo facilities,' 66
and the provision by the Department of Health and Human Services of
"financial assistance to develop tribal gaming enterprises. ' 67 Finally, the
Court married the federal interests to the tribal interests by describing the
Indian tribes at issue:
The tribal games at present provide the sole source of revenues
for the operation of the tribal governments and the provision of
tribal services. They are also the major sources of employment
on the reservations. Self-determination and economic development
are not within reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and pro-
vide employment for their members. The Tribes' interests obvi-
ously parallel the federal interests. 68
The Court downplayed the State's alleged interest in "preventing the
infiltration of the tribal games by organized crime" in light of these fed-
eral and tribal interests. 69 In fact, the Court poked holes in the State's ar-
guments, suggesting that there was no evidence of involvement by organ-
ized crime and it was acting hypocritically: "[t]o the extent that [it sought]
62 See id. at 220-21.
63 Id. at 217.
64 Id. at 217 & n.20.
65 See id. at 217-18. The Court quoted at length from an affidavit submitted by the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs Director of Indian Services, which read:
It is the department's position that tribal bingo enterprises are an appropriate
means by which tribes can further their economic self-sufficiency, the economic
development of reservations and tribal self-determination. All of these are federal
goals for the tribes. Furthermore, it is the Department's position that the devel-
opment of tribal bingo enterprises is consistent with and in furtherance of Presi-
dent Reagan's Indian Policy Statement of January 24, 1983.
Id. at 217 n.21.
66 Id. at 218.
67 Id.
68 1d. at 218-19.
69 Id. at 220.
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to prevent any and all bingo games from being played on tribal lands
while permitting regulated, off-reservation games .... "'I
The Court ruled 6-3 in favor of the Cabazon Band.'
States and local governments responded to Cabazon Band by urging
Congress to enact legislation to regulate Indian gaming for the (unex-
pressed) purpose of protecting existing state businesses that engaged in
gaming operations and the (expressed) purpose of reducing the influence
of organized crime on Indian gaming.7" Congress had been debating In-
dian gaming regulatory bills for several years, 3 but Cabazon Band cre-
ated the political impetus to finalize an Indian gaming act.74
On October 17, 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act.75 The Act was a compromise between the interests of Indian
tribes that had been recognized and validated by the Supreme Court and
the interests of the state and local governments. 76 Congress, authorized to
take action in this arena by the Indian Commerce Clause, 77 created a
novel scheme for the codification, authorization, and regulation of Indian
gaming. As shown below, Congress intended to codify the Cabazon Band
decision for high-stakes bingo,78 authorize tribes to conduct casino-style
70 Id. at 220-21. More recent studies conclude that Indian casinos do not attract either
organized or disorganized crime. See Renee Ann Cramer, Perceptions of the Process: In-
dian Gaming as it Affects Federal Tribal Acknowledgment Law and Practices, 27 L. &
POL'Y 578, 596 (2005).
71 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 222.72 See 134 CONG. REC. H5028 (July 6, 1988) (Statement of Rep. Udall); LIGHT &
RAND, supra note 5, at 42; Brad Jolly, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Un-
wavering Policy of Termination Continues, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273, 297 (1997); Robert B.
Porter, Indian Gaming Regulation: A Case Study in Neo-Colonialism, 5 GAMING L. REV.
299, 306 (2001); Mark C. Wenzel, Note/Comment, Let the Chips Fall Where They May:
The Spokane Indian Tribe's Decision to Proceed With Casino Gambling Without a State
Compact, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 467, 475 (1994-1995).
3 See, e.g., Ducheneaux Testimony, supra note 6, at 171 ("In 1983, in the 98th Con-
gress, Mr. Udall introduced the first bill to affect[ ] gambling activities by Indian tribes.");
Horwitz, supra note 29, at 164 (noting legislative history on IGRA as far back as the 98th
Congress).
14 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 43; Porter, supra note 72, at 306.
75 See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000)).
76 See In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003) (quot-
ing Artichoke Joe's v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2002)), cert. denied,
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. California, 540 U.S. 1179 (2004); Colo. River
Indian Tribes v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 383 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (D.D.C. 2005);
Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 118 P.3d 203, 207 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005); Ducheneaux Testi-
mony, supra note 6 at 175 ("The concept of a Tribal-State compact was the mechanism
through which the Congress attempted to resolve the two opposing extreme positions in a
manner which would preserve tribal self-government, yet recognize and accommodate
legitimate state interests.").
" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights
to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175,
205 (2000) (describing the Indian Commerce Clause as a "grant of singular authority to
Congress to regulate intercourse and trade with Indian tribes, the only minority group ex-
plicitly mentioned in the Constitution").78 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(5), 2702(1); S. REP. No. 100-446, at 22-23 (1988).
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gaming in certain states79 (simultaneously limiting inherent tribal sover-
eignty to open up casinos in other states)8" and create a regulatory scheme
for Indian gaming.8' Overall, however, Congress made clear that the pur-
pose of the Act was to benefit Indian tribes, not states,82 and to expand tribal
opportunities for self-determination, self-government, economic devel-
opment, and political stability.83
Congress first established three classes of Indian gaming. Class I gam-
ing includes traditional tribal games, or gaming that would be regulated
and authorized exclusively by Indian tribes. 4 This class includes games
such as shaymuhkewuybinegunung, a Minnesota Chippewa game involv-
ing dice in the form of sticks marked with turtles and snakes, 5 and puga-
saing, a Michigan Chippewa bowl game using bone and brass pieces carved
in the shapes of snakes, men, and other figures. 6 Class I gaming is not, at
this time, a lucrative revenue option for Indian tribes. 7 Congress defined
class II gaming to mean high-stakes bingo, 8 the type of games tribes first
began in California, Florida, Michigan, and New York, and the type at
issue in the Cabazon Band litigation. 9 Congress intended to leave the
regulation of class II games to Indian tribes, thus codifying the Cabazon
Band decision, except to the extent that the National Indian Gaming
Commission is required to approve class II tribal gaming ordinances and
to issue gaming licenses. 90
79 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (authorizing casino-style gaming in certain states
"that permit[ ] such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity").
80 See Jolly, supra note 72, at 301; Light & Rand, supra note 13, at 270; Naomi Mezey,
Note, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48
STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996); Richard A. Monette, Treating Tribes as States Under Fed-
eral Statutes in the Environmental Arena: Where Laws of Nature and Natural Law Collide,
21 VT. L. REV. 111, 132 (1996); Porter, supra note 72, at'306-09; Tsosie, supra note 13, at
65-66.
8) See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(3), 2702(3), 2704.
82 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 44-48; Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians, 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 933 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
13 See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).8 4See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(l).
85 See Stewart Culin, Games of the North American Indians, in TWENTY-FOURTH AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF ETHNOLOGY 3, 64 (W. H. Holmes ed., 1907).
86 See Id. at 66-67.
87 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 306 ("Class I gaming is not of legal or economic
significance."); Mark. J. Cowan, Leaving Money on the Table(s): An Examination of Fed-
eral Income Tax Policy Towards Indian Tribes, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 345, 382 (2004) ("Such
games are not regulated by the IGRA and tend to generate insignificant revenues.").
88 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7).
89 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 204-05 (1987);
LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 39-43.
9°See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(2), 2710(c)(1); S. REP. No. 100-446, at 1 (1988).
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Congress defined class III games to include all other gaming.9 This
broad definition includes casino-style gaming, such as slot machines, poker,
blackjack, craps, and keno.9" Class III gaming is the kind of gaming that
can be very lucrative for Indian tribes,9 3 although some forms of class II
gaming can also generate enormous revenues.9 4 It is here that Congress's
regulatory and authorization scheme became the most creative. Congress
created a structure whereby Indian tribes could not conduct class III gaming
without entering into a class III gaming compact with the governor of the
state where the tribe wished to begin gaming." In the compact, the tribe and
the state would decide basic issues about the tribal gaming operations,
such as which sovereign would handle the regulation of the facility, what
types of games could be played at the facility, and other logistical ques-
tions. 96 Congress also prohibited class III gaming in states that prohibited
all forms of these games, 97 importing the Cabazon Band analysis into the
class III scheme. 9s In states such as Nebraska or Texas, where no one was
authorized to operate slot machines at any time, Congress did not author-
ize Indian tribes to engage in class III gaming. 99
In the arena of class III gaming, Congress anticipated the problem
that states might refuse to negotiate a gaming compact with the tribes.' °
First, Congress placed the burden on the states to negotiate in good faith
with the tribes.' 0' Second, if the state refused to negotiate in good faith,
Congress created an enforcement mechanism against the states by ex-
tending jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear claims by a tribe with
whom a state had refused to negotiate in good faith. 02 Congress intended
a scheme under which a tribe could still commence class III gaming op-
erations even if a state stonewalled the tribe. 3 Absent this enforcement
91 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8). The National Indian Gaming Commission later promul-
gated a more specific definition of class III gaming. See 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (2004).
92 See 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (2006); LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 46.
93 See Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 949-50 (2000);
Kathryn R. L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of
Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POI'Y & L. 381, 401
n. 118 (1997); Tsosie, supra note 13, at 79.
94 See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L.J.
285, 290 (2004) (referencing so-called class II slot machines).
95 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(1)(C), 2710(d)(3).
96 See 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(d)(3)(C).
97 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
98 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1987).
99 See Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 02001 (2002); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0278 (2004).
100 See Ducheneaux Testimony, supra note 6, at 175-76 ("The problem for the negotia-
tors [of IGRA] was how to permit the state to have a role in regulation of Indian class III
gaming, which Cabazon precluded, through the requirement for a compact without placing
tribes at the mercy of a state which would not act in good faith.").
101 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
102 See id. at § 2710(d)(7)(A).
103 See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5-6, 18-19 (1988).
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mechanism against the states, Congress might not have been willing to
include a compact requirement.'°4
Congress also created the National Indian Gaming Commission
("NIGC") to serve as the federal component of the regulatory scheme. 0 5
Congress intended for federal and state regulation of Indian gaming to be
light, unless the tribe consented to such regulation, and it did not intend
the NIGC to act as a massive bureaucratic regulatory body."0 6 In fact, for
several years, the NIGC's annual budget was limited to a mere $8 million,0 7
and Congress did not authorize the NIGC to promulgate substantive regu-
lations.' The tribes would be the primary regulator of class II gaming,' °9
while Congress left class III gaming to the tribes and the states."0 As a
final and important policy, Congress prohibited states from collecting
taxes on Indian gaming operations and revenues."'
In summary, the Act created a delicate, yet balanced, structure in re-
lation to class III gaming. Prior to IGRA, the states could do little or nothing
to prevent class III gaming because the federal government usually had
exclusive jurisdiction over criminal gaming enterprises in Indian Coun-
try. After IGRA, the states could prevent class III gaming by prohibiting
all class III-style gaming within their borders. Prior to IGRA, the states
had no say in the regulation of class III gaming by Indian tribes. After
IGRA, the states could force tribes to make concessions on regulation
during the compacting process.
114 See United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1998);
Hearing on Review of Court Decision on Indian Gambling Before the S. Indian Affairs Comm.,
104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Alex Tallchief Skibine, Professor of Law, University of
Utah) [hereinafter Alex Skibine Testimony] ("Had we known that Congress could not waive
the state's sovereign immunity, there is no doubt in my mind that we would have selected
the Secretary of the Interior as the recourse in cases where states failed to negotiate in good
faith.").
105 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702(3), 2704.
1' See Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm., 383 F. Supp. 2d 123,
132 (D.D.C. 2005) ("A careful review of the text, the structure, the legislative history and
the purpose of the IGRA, as well as each of the arguments advanced by the NIGC, leads
the Court to the inescapable conclusion that Congress plainly did not intend to give the
NIGC the authority to issue MICS for class III gaming .... "); see also Ducheneaux &
Taylor, supra note 13, at 34-54 (analyzing the legislative history and the text of IGRA to
conclude that the NIGC lacked authority to promulgate Minimum Internal Control Stan-
dards at 25 C.ER. § 542).
107 See Sandra J. Ashton, The Role of the National Indian Gaming Commission in the
Regulation of Tribal Gaming, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 545, 546 (2003).
108 See Colo. River Indian Tribes, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
'09 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b); Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13, at 44-48 (describ-
ing how the NIGC does not have authority to promulgate Minimum Internal Control Stan-
dards at 25 C.F.R. § 542 for class II gaming).
l0 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1); Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13, at 44 ("Except
for Commission approval of a tribal gaming ordinance for class III gaming and authority of
the Commission to approve any management contract related to such class III gaming, the
sole authority for regulation for that activity was to be as agreed upon in the compact.").
I See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4).
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Casino-style gaming created the possibility of significant govern-
ment revenues for many Indian tribes, but never before had Congress
opened the door to direct state regulation of the activities of Indian tribes
through the compacting process. The Act answered most of the unsettled
questions of Indian gaming and put the weight of the federal government
behind tribal gaming operations development." 2
Indian gaming exploded after the Cabazon Band decision and the
subsequent enactment of IGRA, 1" 3 altering the tribal-federal-state relation-
ship in fundamental ways. There were some tribes located far from a
large gaming market that were still able to establish successful gaming
operations." 4 Indian gaming provided needed job opportunities and reve-
nue for tribes, and many tribes were able to use that revenue to fund im-
portant governmental services-both for themselves and for non-gaming
tribes-that the federal and state governments had failed to offer.' Despite
12 See Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13, at 28 (describing how IGRA answered
questions about the legality of class III gaming in light of the Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1171 (2000), and quelled the state, local, and business political forces arrayed against
Indian gaming by offering a federal solution).
113 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 7-8; see also Ranat, supra note 21, at 953;
Rand & Light, supra note 93, at 382 (describing a "tremendous boom in Indian gaming"
since enactment of IGRA); Cox, Gaming Enforcement, supra note 38, at D-1 ("Since
IGRA's enactment in 1988, there has been a rapid growth in Indian gaming operations.
Today there are 274 Indian gaming facilities owned and operated by 182 Indian tribes.").
114 See Light & Rand, supra note 13, at 282 ("The experiences of the Plains Tribes
provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis, demonstrating that even modest casino
profits strengthen tribal governments and preserve or enhance tribal sovereignty. Such tribes,
with large memberships and little access to metropolitan markets, are unlikely to experi-
ence dramatic economic and social rejuvenation based solely on casino revenues. Yet from
the tribes' perspective, casino employment and even modest revenue fund tribal strategies
to overcome reservation poverty and accompanying social ills.").
"' See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 218-19 (.1987)
("The Cabazon and Morongo Reservations contain no natural resources which can be ex-
ploited. The tribal games at present provide the sole source of revenues for the operation of
the tribal governments and the provision of tribal services. They are also the major sources
of employment on the reservations."); Artichoke Joe's Grand Cal. Casino v. Norton, 353
F.3d 712, 741 (9th Cir. 2003) ("California's regulatory scheme benefits nongaming tribes
because they receive distributions from the funds that the State requires gaming tribes to
allocate to the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust."), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 51 (2004);
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Att'y for the W.
Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002) ("In fiscal year 2001, [the
casino] provided approximately 89% of the Band's gaming revenue. Revenues from the
Turtle Creek Casino also fund approximately 270 additional tribal government positions,
which administer a variety of governmental programs, including health care, elder care, child
care, youth services, education, housing, economic development and law enforcement. The
casino also provides some of the best employment opportunities in the region, and all of its
employees are eligible for health insurance benefits, disability benefits and 401(k) benefit
plans. The casino also provides revenues to regional governmental entities and provides
significant side benefits to the local tourist economy.") (citations to record omitted), aff'd
369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 987 F. Supp. 804, 808
n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("Congress recognized that for many tribes, gaming income 'often
means the difference between an adequate governmental program and a skeletal program
that is totally dependent on Federal funding."') (quoting S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 2-3
(1988)); Cramer, supra note 70, at 596-97 ("Gaming revenues have allowed some tribes to
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perceptions to the contrary, only a few tribes became truly rich from In-
dian gaming."6 Many tribes offer no gaming at all, whether due to market
conditions, political issues, or cultural reasons."'
II. RUPTURE: SEMINOLE TRIBE
A. The End of Equal Bargaining Power
Congress spoke in great detail about its efforts to provide a careful
balance between states and tribes in IGRA. The Senate Report notes that
the tribal-state compacting process "is a viable mechanism for settling
various matters between two equal sovereigns.""' 8 Congress balanced "the
strong concerns of states [regarding] state laws and regulations relating
to sophisticated forms of class III gaming ... against the strong tribal
opposition to any imposition of State jurisdiction over activities on In-
dian lands.""' 9 Congress made clear that it had considered state and tribal
interests and that, despite state interests, states should not be allowed to
preclude Indian tribes from conducting class III gaming in accordance
with IGRA:
A tribe's governmental interests include raising revenues to pro-
vide governmental services for the benefit of the tribal commu-
nity and reservation residents, promoting public safety as well
as law and order on tribal lands, realizing the objectives of eco-
establish or improve their own fully certified police departments; many of them are able to
offer specialties such as bomb and drug-sniffing dogs and extra personnel, which are often
loaned out to non-Indian police forces in the region.") (citations omitted); Kolkema, supra
note 23, at 367-68 ("Indian gaming is not regarded as a commercial activity. Unlike com-
mercial activities, IGRA requires that all revenues from gaming operations be reinvested in
the tribal community to further economic development.").
116 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 108; John Fredericks III, America's First Na-
tions: The Origins, History and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J. L. & POL'Y
307, 346 (1999); Kathryn R. L. Rand, There are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the
Success ofIndian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 47, 60-64 (2002).
"7 See David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors From
Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
173, 187-88 (2004) ("But most reservations, frequently the most impoverished, are too remote
to attract many customers, so incurring sizable fixed costs for gaming operations would
actually reduce tribal welfare. Thus fewer than half of the tribes participate in any gaming
enterprises." (citation omitted)); Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences, 29
ARiz. ST. L.J. 205, 239-40 (1997) ("Like the Seneca, both the Navajo and the Hopi defeated
gaming referenda. These two tribes did so, however, without any strong factional splits
and, indeed, with an absence of acrimony." (citations omitted)).
"I S. REP. No. 100-446, at 13 (1988) (emphasis added); see also AT&T Corp. v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899, 916 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing S. REP. No. 100-446, at 4-5);
Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1248 (1lth Cir. 1999) (quoting S. REP.
No. 100-446, at 13).
"I S. REP. No. 100-446, at 13.
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nomic self-sufficiency and Indian self-determination, and regulat-
ing activities of persons within its jurisdictional borders. A State's
governmental interests with respect to class III gaming on In-
dian lands include the interplay of such gaming with the State's
public policy, safety, law and other interests, as well as impacts
on the State's regulatory system, including its economic interest
in raising revenue for its citizens. It is the Committee's intent
that the compact requirement for class III not be used as a justifi-
cation by a State for excluding Indian tribes from such gaming
or for the protection of other State-licensed gaming enterprises
from free market competition with Indian tribes. 20
As might be expected, IGRA's complicated balancing act involving
three sovereigns, divisive political and cultural questions, and large amounts
of cash and lawyers generated incredible amounts of litigation.' 2 1 The
first wave of litigation can be labeled the "constitutional wave," where
several tribes and states sought to overturn the statute as an invalid exer-
cise of congressional authority. 122 These lawsuits were unsuccessful and
never reached the Supreme Court, although there are some derivative suits
regarding the authority of the NIGC that remain open. 23
The second wave of litigation can be labeled the "bad faith wave,"
where tribes accused several states, including California, Florida, and
Michigan, of refusing to negotiate gaming compacts in good faith. 24 The
tribes filed suit in federal courts against the states and, later, their gover-
nors. 2 The states responded by asserting their Eleventh Amendment immu-
1
20 Id.
121 See Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1239 (referring to IGRA as a "litigation-spawning
juggernaut").
122 See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United
States, 367 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting tribe's claim that the gubernatorial concur-
rence provision of IGRA violated the Tenth Amendment); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v.
South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting State's claim that IGRA violated the
Tenth Amendment); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9
(D.D.C. 1990) (rejecting tribe's claim that IGRA violated the trust responsibility of the
federal government and the Fifth Amendment).
123 See Col. River Indian Tribes v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 383 F. Supp. 2d 123
(D.D.C. 2005).
124 See Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (Canby, C.J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc), amended on denial
of reh'g, 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Sycuan Band of
Mission Indians v. Wilson, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997); Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of Kickapoo
Reservation in Kan. v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Ponca Tribe of Okla. v.
Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994); Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1016 (1995); Wis. Winnebago Nation v. Thompson,
22 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1994); Rhode Island v. Narragansett Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919 (1994); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Michigan, 5 F.3d 147 (6th Cir. 1993); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d
273 (8th Cir. 1993); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991).
125 See, e.g., Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 5 F.3d at 149 ("Plaintiffs have since amended their
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nity.16 When the lower courts split on the effect of the congressional
"waiver" of state immunity in light of the Eleventh Amendment, 27 the
Supreme Court stepped in and decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida.128 Seminole Tribe ended the "bad faith wave."'
129
In Seminole Tribe, the Seminole Tribe of Florida sued the State of Flor-
ida and its governor in accordance with IGRA's requirements. 30 The de-
fendants sought to dismiss the suit on the theory that the Eleventh Amend-
ment precluded the suit.'3 ' The Supreme Court held that IGRA provided
an "'unmistakably clear' statement of [congressional] intent to abrogate"
state sovereign immunity.'32 However, the Court held that Congress, in
enacting IGRA under the Indian Commerce Clause,'33 had no authority to
waive state sovereign immunity using its Indian Commerce Clause power.'34
In short, Indian tribes no longer had a legal recourse that would allow them
to operate casino-style games where states refused to negotiate in good faith
for a gaming compact.'35
B. Revenue Sharing Agreements
Following Seminole Tribe, Indian tribes remained free to exploit their
class II gaming opportunities where no gaming compact was required,
36
but where states refused to negotiate for class III gaming, tribes no longer
could sue the states to force negotiations. Indeed, "[tiribes have a right
without a remedy."'37 Reports indicate that no tribe was able to finalize a
complaint and named Governor John Engler as the defendant.").
,26 See, e.g., id. at 148.
127 See Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (No. 94-12) ("Respondent agrees that the instant decision [11 F.3d
1016 (11th Cir. 1994)] is in direct conflict with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993). In the time since
the filing of the Seminole Tribe's instant petition for certiorari, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has rendered its opinion in Spokane Tribe of Indian v. Washington State [28 F.3d
991] (9th Cir. 1994).").
128 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir.
1998) ("Following the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, the State invoked its
newfound Eleventh Amendment immunity and brought the Tribe's suit to a sudden end.").
130 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51 (also citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)).
131 See id. at 52.
132 Id. at 56-57 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
133 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
134 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. Congress has authority to waive the sover-
eign immunity of states using its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and under the Interstate Commerce Clause, subject to certain limitations. See generally
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 936-61 (3d ed. 2000) (Section
5); id. at 807-24 (Interstate Commerce Clause).
135 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 273-74; Light et al., supra note 16, at 665;
Skibine, supra note 13, at 122; Tsosie, supra note 13, at 66; Washburn, Recurring Prob-
lems, supra note 18, at 430.
'
36 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(a), 2710 (b) (2000).
117 Washburn, Recurring Problems, supra note 18, at 441.
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gaming compact for over two years after the Seminole Tribe decision. 3 s
Some tribes responded by threatening to close down roads in order to force
negotiations.'39 Other tribes sought to amend state law via public referen-
dum to force negotiations.'40 These measures, however, were ineffective. 141
Both states and tribes had reasons to seek agreement. Indian gaming
had too much potential to generate government revenue for states to ig-
nore it. 142 While the states could still afford to reject gaming in most in-
stances, Indian tribes could not because they often did not have a sufficient
alternative tax base.' 43 The financial advantage for the states was obvi-
ous-they could generate revenue without doing much to earn it."4 Addi-
tionally, after Seminole Tribe, states could dictate terms to the tribes.
"I See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 50; Light et al., supra note 16, at 665-66; see
also Ron M. Rosenberg, When Sovereigns Negotiate in the Shadow of the Law: The 1998
Arizona-Pima Maricopa Gaming Compact, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 283, 294 (1999) ("In
August 1998, the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community ... and the State of Ari-
zona entered into the first post-Seminole Tribe compact in the United States.").
119 See, e.g., Jacob Viarrial, Remarks of Pojoaque Pueblo Governor Jacob Viarrial, 14
T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 533, 534 (1996) ("Our thinking was, if the Governor did not have
the authority to sign the gaming compacts, then none of the other agreements that he had
ever signed with us were legal either. That included any agreements where we granted the
state the right to put highways through our land .... I might add that because of the road
closing, the United States Attorney came back and told us that if we would agree not to
close the roads, he would agree not to shut our casinos down. We could all agree to that. So
we kept our casinos open.") (footnotes omitted).
14o See K. Alexa Koenig, Comment, Gambling on Proposition ]A: The California In-
dian Self-Reliance Amendment, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2002) (describing Califor-
nia's Proposition IA); Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 296-97 (discussing Arizona's Propo-
sition 201).
14' See, e.g., Bryan J. Nowlin, Note, Conflicts in Sovereignty: The Narragansett Tribe
in Rhode Island, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151, 161-64 (2005-2006) (discussing how state
referenda were unhelpful to the Narragansett Tribe in Rhode Island).
142 See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 13 (1988) ("In the Committee's view, both State and
tribal governments have significant governmental interests in the conduct of class III gam-
ing."); LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 54 ("[S]tate governments began to view lotteries as
well as revenue-sharing agreements with gaming tribes as new revenue sources to combat
budgetary crises .. "); see also Glenn Coin, Casinomania: A Casino in Every Neighbor-
hood, Hope for Money in Every Coffer, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Jan. 12, 2003, at
A l ("State legislators and the governor are betting that the largest expansion of gambling
in state history will help resolve the state's fiscal crunch."); Amy Lane, State Looks to
Indian Casinos to Add Revenue, CRAIN's DET. Bus., Apr. 14, 2003, at 6 (discussing how
Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm and the Michigan legislature "are looking to
Michigan's American Indian tribes as potential revenue sources").
'43 See supra text accompanying notes 114 & 115.
4 See, e.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, Betting on Their Future: Flush with Cash, Ameri-
can Indians are Laying the Creative Groundwork for New Ventures, A.B.A. J., May 2006,
at 33, 36 ("For the State, it's a sweet deal. It doesn't have to make any concessions or put
up any money to get a large new tax base. At Quil Ceda, for example, all the utility work
... was paid for by the tribes."). See generally Del Laverdure, Shall We Pay Taxes? Pros
and Cons, Address at Turtle Mountain Community College Project Peacemaker Indian Law
Summit (Aug. 1, 2005) (arguing that state and local governments benefit from tribal eco-
nomic development without providing additional services, and alleging that state and local
governments engage in "taxation without representation" in Indian Country).
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Not surprisingly, many states began to extort Indian tribes.'45 For ex-
ample, they demanded a cut of the profits from class III gaming. 46 Other
states demanded treaty rights and tax negotiation concessions. 47 Some
compacts written after Seminole Tribe contain interesting or unusual pro-
visions that extract money from tribes, yet are theoretically consistent
with IGRA. For example, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians pays
$5 million a year to endow the Cherokee Preservation Foundation.148 Some
states in compliance with IGRA 149 also demanded "pay-as-you-go" reve-
nue sharing provisions, such as the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde
Community's agreement to pay the expenses incurred by the Oregon state
police in patrolling their gaming operation. 50
141 See, e.g., Edison, supra note 21, at 327 ("Jacob Viarrial, governor of the Pojoaque,
told lawmakers that 'revenue sharing has become a smokescreen for extortion."') (foot-
notes omitted); Koenig, supra note 140, at 1059-60 ("The compact tries to avoid potential
illegality by expressly stating that revenue percentages were not imposed as a condition to
compact negotiations (which would be extortion) .. "); Light, et al., supra note 16, at 666
("Without the ability to challenge a state's demand for revenue sharing in federal court
under IGRA (unless, of course, the state consents to suit, as has California), the danger for
tribes is that states can simply charge tribes what, in practice, amounts to a multi-million-
dollar fee to conduct Class III gaming, in direct contravention to tribes' sovereign right
under Cabazon and Congress's intent under IGRA."); Kathryn R. L. Rand & Steven A.
Light, Do "Fish and Chips" Mix? The Politics of Gaming in Wisconsin, 2 GAMING L. REV.
129, 140 (1998) [hereinafter Rand & Light, Fish and Chips] ("Wisconsin is using the com-
pact negotiations in order to extort revenue from the tribes in return for 'allowing' them to
maintain their already highly tenuous sovereignty rights."); Robert B. Peacock, Lawmakers
Ignore Facts in Push to Expand Gaming, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Minn.), Mar. 12, 2004, at
9A, available at 2004 WLNR 19227073 ("Rep. Jim Knoblach and Sen. Tom Neuville have
taken the opposite approach in extorting money from the tribes by introducing legislation
to outlaw all video gambling machines in the state beginning Jan. 1, 2006, 'unless the
State's Indian tribes agree to renegotiate the current video gaming compacts."); Jerry
Useem, The Big Gamble: Have American Indians found their new buffalo?, FORTUNE, Oct.
2, 2000, at 222, available at 2000 WLNR 7913728 ("'[The compacts] haven't been negoti-
ated,' complained Frank Chaves, co-chairman of the New Mexico Indian Gaming Associa-
tion. 'They were dictated."').
146 See Role and Funding of the National Indian Gaming Commission: Oversight
Hearing on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Before the S. Indian Affairs Comm., 108th
Cong. 90 (2003) (prepared statement of Aurene M. Martin, Acting Assistant Secretary-
Indian Affairs, Dep't of the Interior), available at http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/070903
hrg/martin.PDF [hereinafter Martin Testimony] ("Another consequence of the Supreme
Court's 1996 decision is that more states have sought to include revenue-sharing provi-
sions in Class III gaming compacts, resulting in a discernable increase in such provisions
in the past seven years.").
141 See KATHRYN R. L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW AND
POLICY 153-54 (2006).
'41 See Second Amendment to Tribal-State Compact Between the E. Band of Cherokee
Indians and the State of N.C. 24 (Jan. 17, 2001), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/
resource/agreements/nc-gaming-easter band-of-cherokeeindians-second-amendment.pdf.
'49 See 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(d)(3)(C)(iii) (2000).
51 See Amended and Restated Tribal-State Compact for Regulation of Class III Gaming
Between the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. and the State of Or.
§ XXVI (Oct. 9, 2001), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/or-gaming-
confederatedtribes_ of_grande-ronde.pdf.
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Tribal and state negotiations and compacts after Seminole Tribe have
one major commonality-revenue sharing with states"5' and state subdivi-
sions. 52 For example, most California tribes operating more than 200 slot
machines must contribute seven to thirteen percent of their average net
winnings per machine to the State of California's Special Distribution
Fund,'53 and must also participate in revenue sharing arrangements with
other tribes." 4 As Professors Light and Rand report, "All told, in 2003 alone,
tribes provided $759 million to state and local governments .... ,1155
Under the post-Seminole Tribe regime, revenue sharing is justified as
an arm's length transaction in which the state receives a revenue sharing
provision and the tribes receive access to exclusive gaming markets.'56
The problem, as the following examples show, is that revenue sharing per-
centages have increased while exclusive gaming markets have begun to
disappear.
"I See, e.g., Tribal-State Compact Between the State of Cal. and the Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians § 5.1(a) (May 16, 2000), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/
agreements/ca-gaming-cabazonband of missionindians-5-16-2000.pdf; A Compact be-
tween the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians and the State of Michigan Providing for
the Conduct of Tribal Class III Gaming by the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians § 17
(Feb. 18, 1999), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/mi-gaming-
pokagon..band of potawatomi-12-3-1998.pdf; Indian Gaming Compact between the Pueblo
of Pojoaque and the State of New Mexico, Revenue Sharing Agreement 2-3 (Aug. 29,
1999), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncairesource/agreements/nm-gaming-pueblo-of-
pojoaque.pdf; Nation-State Gaming Compact between the Seneca Nation of Indians and
the State of New York 12(b)(1) (2002), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/
agreements/ny.gaming-seneca nation-4-12-2002.pdf. See generally LIGHT & RAND, supra
note 5, at 69-73; Light, et al., supra note 16.
52 It matters a great deal who benefits from the revenues paid out by tribes. Indian
tribes that negotiate payments to the state only, such as in Connecticut, can expect local
cities and counties that receive nothing to muster a political fight with the tribes. See
REN9E ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF TRIBAL Ac-
KNOWLEDGMENT 160-61 (2005) [hereinafter CRAMER, CASH] (describing the political
forces mobilized against Connecticut gaming tribes and against federal recognition of
other Connecticut tribes). Payments to local units of government help to alleviate that po-
litical problem. See Cramer, supra note 70, at 597. For example, because of the good will
engendered payments to local units of government, Michigan Indian tribes such as the
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa have been better able to enter into cross-deputization
agreements with local law enforcement. See Brief of Non-Federal Appellees 10 n.6, Tax-
payers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-5206)
("[T]he [Little River Band of Ottawa Indians] have entered into cooperative law enforce-
ment agreements with state and local governments and generated significant good will
within the surrounding non-Indian communities.") (internal citations omitted).
'53 See, Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and the Hoopa Valley
Tribe § 5.1(a) (May 16,2000), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/
ca-gaming-hoopa-valley-tribe-5-16-2000.pdf.
154 Id. at § 4.3.2.1. Another example is the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, which pays
$7 million each year to local units of government. See Tribal-State Compact for the Con-
duct of Class III Gaming Between the Coushatta Tribe of La. and the State of La. § 12(C)(1)
(Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/recourse/agreements/la-gaming-
coushatta tribe-9-25-2001 .pdf.
155 LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 87 (footnote omitted).
156 See infra Parts lI.B. I and II.B.2.
HeinOnline  -- 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 60 2007
Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming
1. The New Mexico Experience (1997)
Post-Seminole Tribe revenue sharing agreements placed the Secre-
tary of the Interior, charged with approving and publishing gaming com-
pacts, "'57 in a bind. In 1997, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt declined to
approve or disapprove the gaming compact between the State of New
Mexico and the Pueblo of Isleta.'58 In accordance with the statute, the
refusal to approve or decline meant that the compact was considered ap-
proved.' However, Secretary Babbitt's letter stated that the compact was
approved "only to the extent it [was] consistent with the provisions of
IGRA."' The compact "require[d] the Pueblo to pay the State 16% of
'net win' . . . as long as the State did not take any action directly or indi-
rectly to attempt to restrict the scope of Indian gaming permitted under the
Compact, and did not permit any further expansion of non-tribal class III
gaming in the State."' 6' Keeping in mind the prohibition on state taxes,
assessments, or fees on Indian gaming, Secretary Babbitt wrote:
To date, the Department has approved payments to a State only
when the State has agreed to provide substantial exclusivity, i.e.,
to completely prohibit non-Indian gaming from competing with
Indian gaming, or when all payments cease while the State per-
mits competition to take place .... In addition, because of the
Department's trust responsibility, we seek to ensure that the cost
to the Pueblo-in this case up to 16% of "net win"-is appropriate
in light of the benefit conferred on the Pueblo.
In light of the large payments required under the Compact, the
Department questions whether the limited exclusivity provided
the Pueblo meets the standards discussed in the previous para-
graph. The Compact does not provide substantial exclusivity. In-
deed, the Compact seems to expand non-Indian gaming by allow-
ing for a state lottery, the operation of a large number of electronic
gaming devices by fraternal, veterans, or other nonprofit mem-
bership organizations, gaming by nonprofit tax exempt organiza-
tions for fundraising purposes, and the operation of electronic
gaming devices at horse tracks every day that live or simulcast
horse racing occurs.'62
' See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (2000).
58 Letter from Hon. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of Interior, to Hon. Gary E. Johnson, Gover-
nor, State of N.M., at 3 (Aug. 23, 1997), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/archives/
indnmcom.html [hereinafter Babbitt Letter].59 See id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C)).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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In addition, the compact required the Pueblo to pay flat regulatory fees
to the state. 63 Upon consideration of the terms, the Secretary also stated
that the Department "has serious questions about the permissibility of this
regulatory fee structure under IGRA."' 6 According to Secretary Babbitt,
"[u]nlike other tribal-state compacts, this Compact does not require the
State to provide an accounting of the regulatory fees in order to ensure
that the payments actually match the cost of regulation ....
The Secretary of the Interior saw the advantage of the revenue shar-
ing agreements for tribes, but refused to take an affirmative position that
all revenue sharing agreements are valid under IGRA. The Secretary cre-
ated administrative policy that the department would approve such agree-
ments where a state granted "'substantial exclusivity' for Indian gaming
in exchange for the payment."'6 In the case of the seven Michigan Indian
tribes that entered into gaming compacts in 1993, for example, the exclu-
sive market they shared as a collective group was the entire State of Michi-
gan. 67 Once the exclusive market gave way to the state's grant of three ca-
sino licenses and subsequent opening of the new casinos in the City of
Detroit, the revenue sharing provision of the gaming compacts was sev-
ered. 68
2. The New York Experience (2002)
Revenue sharing, as tied to exclusive gaming markets, is but a short-
term solution. As Indian and non-Indian gaming grows nationwide, the
opportunity to create exclusive gaming markets has declined. Each new
revenue sharing agreement is based on a smaller exclusive gaming mar-
ket. At some point, the exclusive gaming market granted will be too
small to justify the amount of revenue sharing under the standard created
by the Secretary. As Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton pointed out in
reference to the gaming compact between the Seneca Nation and the
State of New York, if a tribe's exclusive gaming market is four rural coun-
ties, how does that justify a twenty-five percent payment of net win to the
state and local communities? 69
Secretary Norton followed Secretary Babbitt's approach by allowing
the Seneca gaming compact to take effect without secretarial approval or
163 See Babbitt Letter, supra note 158, at 2.
164Id.
165 Id.
'6 Martin Testimony, supra note 146, at 2.
167 See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 271 F.3d 235, 237 (6th
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Seven Tribes agreed to make semi-annual payments of eight percent of
the net win from their casinos' electronic games of chance, so long as the Seven Tribes
collectively enjoyed the 'exclusive right to operate' those types of games within the state.").
16 See id. at 239.
169 See Letter from Gale A. Norton, Secretary of Interior, to Hon. Cyrus Schindler, Na-
tion President, Seneca Nation of Indians (Nov. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Norton Letter].
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disapproval.'7 ° The Seneca compact added a new twist to the "substantial
exclusivity" requirement-it created exclusivity in a 10,500 square mile
area in western New York State by denying future opportunities to engage in
gaming for neighboring tribes.'' Specifically, the compact granted a twenty-
five-mile radius of exclusivity to the Seneca Nation to game in Buffalo,
New York, excluding other tribes such as the Tuscarora Nation which had
equal claims to that region.' The Tuscarora Nation argued that allowing
the Seneca Nation to game in Buffalo violated the Secretary's trust re-
sponsibility to all Indian tribes,'73 but Secretary Norton rejected that ar-
gument by opining that IGRA "did not create an absolute right to off-
reservation gaming." ''74
Of particular importance is the portion of Secretary Norton's state-
ment regarding off-reservation gaming. The Seneca Nation compact arose
out of a congressionally approved land claims settlement between New
York and the Nation: the Seneca Nation Settlement Act.'75 This land set-
tlement statute required the Secretary to acquire parcels in Buffalo and
Niagara Falls to be held in trust for the benefit of the Seneca Nation, which
would allow the Nation to engage in "off-reservation gaming"'7 6 because
the newly acquired lands were not considered part of the reservation. Most
off-reservation gaming proposals require the tribe to petition the Secre-
tary to exercise her discretion to take land into trust in accordance with
the general fee-to-trust acquisition statute, 77 but the Seneca proposal was
different. For Secretary Norton, this statute, which was a mandatory fee-
to-trust acquisition, took away her discretion to refuse to take the land
into trust for off-reservation gaming purposes. 78 Secretary Norton made
clear that she "believe[d] that IGRA does not envision that off-reservation
gaming would become pervasive."'' 79 This was significant because for the
first time, a tribe and a state attempted to solve the problem of dwindling
gaming market exclusivity by seeking off-reservation gaming markets. 8 '
1T0 See id. at 1 ("I have decided to allow this Compact to take effect without [s]ecretarial
action.").
171 See id. at 3-4.
172 See id. at 4-5.
173 See id. at 4.
174 Norton Letter, supra note 169, at 5.
175 See id. at 5 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1774).
176 See id. at 2, 5 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1774).
'
77 See 25 U.S.C. § 465.
178 See Norton Letter at 6 ("I want to emphasize, however, that the analysis regarding
off-reservation land as part of a Congressionally approved settlement greatly differs from
the analysis the Department engages in when the issue is simply a trust acquisition for off-
reservation gaming.").
171 Id. at 2.
180 Martin Testimony, supra note 146, at 3. As former Acting Assistant Secretary of In-
dian Affairs Aurene Martin testified:
Since taking office, Secretary Norton has raised the question whether the law pro-
vides her with sufficient discretion to approve off-reservation Indian gaming ac-
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The previous examples show how the Department of the Interior has
implemented Seminole Tribe in particular cases in light of competing
pressures by states, Indian tribes, and a shrinking number of gaming mar-
kets. The following section details the Department of the Interior's more
general response to the Seminole Tribe decision.
C. The Secretarial Procedure
The United States has long been known both legally and politically
as the trustee of Indians and Indian tribes.' The Department of the Inte-
rior is empowered and obligated by federal statutes to manage Indian
affairs'82 and, by extension, act as the trustee on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment. 83 In some areas of law, including Indian gaming, the forms that
the trust relationship takes are made explicit. 84 The Department plays an
important role in the negotiation of tribal-state compacts. IGRA states:
If the State does not consent during the 60-day period described
in [25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi)] to a proposed compact sub-
quisitions that are great distances from their reservations, so-called "far-flung lands."
This is further framed by what appears to be the latest trend of states that are in-
terested in the potential of revenue sharing with tribes encouraging tribes to focus
on selecting gaming location[s] on new lands based solely on market potential
rather than exercising governmental jurisdiction on existing Indian lands.
Id.
Id' See, e.g., Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 642 (1943) (Murphy, J., dis-
senting) ("We have held that the Government in its relations with the Indian tribes occu-
pies the position of a fiduciary, that the relationship is similar to that of guardian and ward,
and that the duties and responsibilities of the United States toward its wards require a gen-
erous interpretation.") (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27, 28 (1886);
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)); Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. at 296-97 ("In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the
Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self
imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous deci-
sions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility
and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the
Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards."); CANBY,
supra note 35, at 35 ("Some form of special relationship between the federal government
and the Indian tribes was probably implicit in the decision, made immediately after the
Revolution, to keep Indian affairs in the hands of the federal government as a means of pro-
tecting the tribes from the states and their citizens (thereby avoiding Indian wars)."); COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw § 5.04[4] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005); U.S.
COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS IN IN-
DIAN COUNTRY 2-6 (2003) (describing the trust responsibility as a "civil right").
182 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2000).
183 See 25 U.S.C. § 13.
184 See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003) (relying
largely on United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) for the conclusion that the trust
relationship created in Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000), supplies a waiver of sovereign
immunity and thus creates a right of action against the United States); Mitchell, 463 U.S.
206 (interpreting Tucker Act to waive sovereign immunity within the trust relationship in
Indian affairs).
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mitted by a mediator under [§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(v)], the mediator
shall notify the Secretary and the Secretary shall prescribe, in
consultation with the Indian tribe, procedures (I) which are con-
sistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator un-
der [§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)], the provisions of this chapter, and the
relevant provisions of the laws of the State, and (II) under which
class III gaming may be conducted on the Indian lands over which
the Indian tribe has jurisdiction."5
In the pre-Seminole Tribe world of Indian gaming, Congress gave the Secre-
tary a mandate to enforce and implement gaming compacts selected by a
mediator in accordance with Section 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).' 86
After the decision in Seminole Tribe, the Secretary of the Interior
sought to reshape the Secretary's role under the new legal regime. Fol-
lowing the understanding of congressional staffers familiar with the ne-
gotiations leading up to the enactment of IGRA, such as Alex Skibine,
former deputy counsel on Indian Affairs for the House Interior Commit-
tee, and citing IGRA and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9,87 the Secretary promul-
gated a rule, now codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 291, that allows a tribe to invoke
a secretarial procedure akin to that of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) if a
state refuses to negotiate a class III gaming compact in good faith and
invokes its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.'88 However, the
Secretary's authority to promulgate the rule has been challenged.S 9
If Part 291 is a valid exercise of the Secretary's authority, the proce-
dure would be a very effective tool that tribes could use to avoid the intran-
sigence of a state refusing to engage in good faith compact negotiations.
However, nothing in the text of IGRA allows the tribe or the Secretary to
bypass the requirement of IGRA that a federal court make a determina-
tion that the state "has failed to negotiate in good faith with the Indian
tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming
activities.... " 9 0 As the Secretary asserted in promulgating the final rule,
185 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
18 See id.
I87 See United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1998);
Alex Skibine Testimony, supra note 104.
88 See Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 FED. REG. 17535, 17536-37 (Apr. 12, 1999)
(codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291); see also Request for Comments on Establishing Departmental
Procedures To Authorize Class III Gaming on Indian Lands When a State Raises an Elev-
enth Amendment Defense To Suit Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 61 FED. REG.
21394 (May 10, 1996) ("The Supreme Court's Seminole decision does not affect the valid-
ity of existing class III gaming compacts, but it does require the United States to consider
the effect of a State's refusal to engage in remedial litigation designed to oversee the com-
pacting process.").
189 See Santee Sioux Nation v. Norton, No. 8:05CV147, 2006 WL 2792734 (D. Neb.,
Sept. 26, 2006); see also Martin Testimony, supra note 146, at 2 (noting legal challenges to
the Secretary's authority to promulgate the rule filed by Florida and Alabama).
1- 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
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Part 291 restores a critical portion of IGRA and fulfills Congressional in-
tent, 91 but is that enough to authorize the rule? The Ninth Circuit suggested,
without ruling, that this procedure would not have been valid in the pre-
Seminole Tribe legal world, 9 2 but that, in a post-Seminole Tribe world,
the procedure might be a valid exercise of secretarial discretion in pro-
moting the Congressional intent behind IGRA. 193 Some states and legal
commentators, on the other hand, have attacked the procedure as an inva-
lid exercise of secretarial discretion.'94
The criticisms by states and commentators are not without founda-
tion. Like revenue sharing agreements, nothing in the text of IGRA or even
the legislative history expressly authorizes the secretarial procedure. As a
result, this proposed solution, like that of revenue sharing agreements,
rests on tenuous ground at best.
D. IGRA's Imbalance and a National Backlash Against Indian Gaming
While the Secretary's authority is litigated, the controversy surrounding
Indian gaming continues bitterly. The acrimony between states and tribes
has intensified as political pressures have mounted and has led, at best, to
inefficiency in Indian gaming.
Seminole Tribe made it possible for states to exploit Indian tribes by
exacting massive revenue sharing payments. To generate compensating
revenue, tribes have had to expand their gaming operations outside of their
"I' See Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 FED. REG. At 17537 (Apr. 12, 1999) (codified
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291).
192 See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994), va-
cated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1129 (1996).
191 United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11 th Cir. 1994)).
194 See 64 FED. REG. at 17537 ("Nearly all of the comments from the States reiterated
or expanded on comments previously submitted arguing that the Secretary lacks legal au-
thority to promulgate these regulations."); Martin Testimony, supra note 146, at 2 (identi-
fying legal challenges filed by Florida and Alabama); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTOR-
NEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 454 (Clay Smith ed., 3d ed. 2004)
("The regulation subsequently was challenged by several states .... "); Goldin, supra note
23, at 843 ("A unilateral decision by the Secretary to dictate the parameters for tribal gam-
ing would undermine the congressional objective that underlies IGRA."); Rebecca S.
Linder-Cornelius, The Secretary of Interior as Referee: The States, the Indian Nations, and
How Gambling Led to the Illegality of the Secretary of Interior's Regulations in 29 C.FR.
§ 291, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 696 (2001) ("The Secretary's new regulations defeat the
purpose of the IGRA. The clear intent of the IGRA was to bring the states into the process
of tribal gaming. When the state asserts an Eleventh Amendment defense, the tribes are left
with no recourse. However, in the new regulations, when a state claims it has negotiated in
good faith to no avail, the only recourse it is left with is a biased factfinder who can do
what it wants without any state input."); Laxague, supra note 25, at 91 ("By placing the
adjudication of tribal-state disputes into the hands of an official with a moral and legal
duty to pursue the best interests of the tribes, the Secretary's proposed rules do both parties
a disservice and badly skew the balance of interests intended by Congress when it wrote
the IGRA.").
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existing reservation lands to reach more valuable markets. 95 These gam-
ing markets, of course, were created because "restrictive state gaming laws
create barriers to entry that provide Indian tribes with an artificial monopo-
listic market .... "196 Additionally, it has been suggested that the increas-
ing political influence of Indian tribes has induced some state legislators
"to act in the interests of these tribal constituents."'' 97 An explanation that
is at least as likely, however, is that non-Indian political leaders see inde-
pendent political value in encouraging and helping some tribes expand
their gaming operations to urban areas.
The expansion or even the mere possibility of expansion of Indian
gaming operations into urban areas has contributed significantly to the con-
troversy concerning and resistance towards Indian gaming.'98 Local newspa-
per articles covering Indian gaming expansion to off-reservation areas
describe a potential or actual "backlash" against the tribal interests in
most instances.' 99 As could be expected, this backlash has spilled into the
halls of Congress.2" The congressional agenda of the 109th Congress was
not about tinkering with the Act, but instead was a drastic response to the
growing national concern over "reservation shopping," a political code
word that links off-reservation Indian gaming expansion to smarmy non-
Indian gaming developers and greed.20' Senator Dianne Feinstein's com-
ment in April 2005 aptly described this concern:
195 See Washburn, supra note 94, at 293.
196 Id. at 295.
197 Id. (footnote omitted).
198 See generally LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 63-65.
'99 See, e.g., Editorial, Still a Lousy Idea; "Advisory" Votes or Not, Madera Casino is a
Terrible Choice, FRESNO BEE (Cal.), Aug. 27, 2005, at B8, available at 2005 WLNR
13589669 ("This project, if approved, has the potential to cause a backlash against all Indian
gaming. At some point, if casinos blanket urban areas, the public might decide to allow all-
out Las Vegas gaming in California open to anyone, not just tribes. That would surely cut
into tribal gaming revenues."); A Worsening Bet; Indian Gaming a Worry for Locals, State
and Feds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 10, 2005, at G2, available at 2005 WLNR
10889416 ("Even some tribes already well into the casino/hotel/resort business are looking
askance at some newcomers' plans. They are not only competition; they are also fuel for
backlash from a public already questioning where gambling saturation begins and Indian
sovereignty ends."); Jim Barnett, Wu Goes Against Governor, Opposes Plan for Gorge
Casino, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Apr. 29, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 6744537
("'If we permit this one in Cascade Locks, I don't see a logical stopping point,' [U.S. Rep.
David] Wu, [D-Or.] said. 'That ultimately is harmful to the state of Oregon and to the
tribes. I don't know at what point there would be a popular backlash about tribal casino
gambling."').
200 See Scott Van Voohris, "Reservation Shopping" Spurs Casino Backlash, BOSTON
HERALD, Aug. 9, 2005, at 35, available at 2005 WLNR 12529798 ("A Capitol Hill back-
lash against tribal gambling threatens to torpedo the national expansion of Connecticut's
two giant Indian casinos, Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun."); Off-Rez Gaming Finds Growing
List of Critics, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 2, 2005, at A8, available at 2005 WLNR 10437598
("If off-reservation casinos are allowed to proliferate, McCain told the Associated Press,
'we're going to see a backlash against Indian gaming, because that was not the intent of
the (1998 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).').
201 See, e.g., Jeffrey Mize, Oregon Tribal Leader Wants Ban on Off-Reservation Casi-
nos-Cowlitz Say Foes Are "Misleading People," OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 2005, at Al, avail-
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Attempts at off-reservation gaming and the practice of "reserva-
tion shopping" have increased dramatically in my State over the
past five years and it is now estimated that there may be up to
20 proposals to game outside of tribal lands in California.
There is ... reason to be concerned about off-reservation gam-
ing and its effect on the surrounding communities. I have watched
as out-of-state gaming developers have sought out tribes offer-
ing to assist them in developing casinos near lucrative sites in ur-
ban areas and along central transit routes-far from any nexus
to their historic lands. 202
What is "off-reservation gaming"? In short, "off-reservation gaming" is
not gaming itself but any proposal to conduct Indian gaming on lands not
already located within an Indian reservation or on lands held in trust by
the federal government for the benefit of Indian tribes. By definition, In-
dian gaming cannot occur on off-reservation lands-it must be conducted, in
accordance with IGRA, on "Indian lands. '2 3 "Indian lands" are defined as
trust lands or reservation lands.21 Once land is acquired by the Secretary
for the benefit of an Indian tribe, that land is considered "Indian land" and
the tribe can conduct gaming operations there. In reality, the term "off-
reservation gaming" is oxymoronic and instead refers to an expansion of
Indian land to accommodate increased gaming.
The backlash associated with off-reservation gaming is tied to the
Seminole Tribe decision. Anti-Indian gaming interests regularly turn to
the courts to prevent gaming expansion or to strike down gaming compacts
under state law. 5 This has politicized and weakened IGRA, an already
weak and creaky structure. 20 6
able at 2005 WLNR 18194102 ("Citizens Against Reservation Shopping and other groups
have accused the Cowlitz of trying to create a reservation near La Center solely because of
its economic potential, not its historical and cultural significance to the tribe."); James P.
Sweeney, Proposal Would Enable Joint Casino Projects; Legislation to Add Barriers to
Gaming off of Reservations, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 10, 2005, at A3, available at
2005 WLNR 18296809 ("Pombo's draft legislation would place new constraints-including a
requirement for local approval-on off-reservation casinos, which have become a national
controversy also known as 'reservation shopping."').
202 A Bill to Modify the Date as of which Certain Tribal Land of the Lytton Rancheria
of California is Deemed to be Held in Trust: Oversight Hearing on S. 113 Before the S.
Indian Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 5-6 (2005) (prepared statement of Sen. Dianne Fein-
stein), available at http://indian.senate.gov/2005hrgs/040505hrg/Feinstein.pdf [hereinafter
Feinstein Testimony].
203 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(a)(1), 2710(b)(1), 2710(d)(1) (2000).
204 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4); 25 C.F.R. § 502.12.
205 See, e.g., TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006); City of Roseville v.
Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Dewberry v. Kulongoski, 406 F.Supp. 2d 1136
(D.Or. 2005); Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos v. Norton, No. 02-1754, 2004 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 27498 (D.D.C., Apr. 23, 2004); Complaint, Michigan Gambling Opposition v.
Norton, No. 1:05CVOI 181 (D.D.C. June 13, 2005).2
o6 See Tsosie, supra note 13, at 61.
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Arising after the "constitutionality" and "bad faith" waves of IGRA-
related litigation that culminated in Seminole Tribe, the current voracious
wave of litigation could be labeled the "state law" wave. In it, Indian tribes
and states have negotiated and entered into class III gaming compacts
with revenue sharing provisions, complex regulatory schemes, derivative
state and tribal legislation, and settled expectations-only to have many
of the compacts struck down under state law.2"7 These legal challenges,
whether upholding or striking down gaming compacts, disrupt gaming op-
erations in a significant way. 08 Many gaming compacts-including those
in effect for more than a decade-are vulnerable to challenge as courts
reject laches arguments that would protect against such suits.2"9 The reve-
nue streams of both states and tribes are accordingly at serious risk in many
states. Very little stops anti-gaming organizations or pro-tribal sovereignty
interests from suing the states and tribes to invalidate revenue sharing
agreements.2 10
A fourth wave of litigation involves Indian tribes that seek to com-
mence gaming operations on lands acquired after IGRA's enactment, or
attempts by Indian tribes who did not have federal recognition at the time
Congress enacted IGRA to commence gaming on their initial reservations.
IGRA includes a prohibition on Indian gaming on lands acquired after
the enactment of IGRA in October 1988," but that prohibition is subject
207 The compacts have been invalidated on the theory that the state's constitution does
not provide authority for the governor to negotiate and execute a compact without authori-
zation from the legislature. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d
1012, 1069-79 (D. Ariz. 2001) (striking down Arizona compacts), rev'd, 305 F.3d 1015
(9th Cir. 2002); Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d
990, 1002-09 (Cal. 1999) (striking down California compacts); State ex rel. Stephan v.
Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1183-85 (Kan. 1992) (striking down Kansas compacts); Taxpayers
of Mich. Against Casinos v. Michigan, 657 N.W.2d 503, 514-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)
(upholding Michigan compacts), rev'd, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 1298 (2005); Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 708 N.W.2d 115, 121-26
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (striking down amendments to Michigan compacts); State ex rel.
Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 26-27 (N.M. 1995) (striking down New Mexico compacts);
Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1060-61 (N.Y.
2003) (striking down New York compacts); Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 696-97
(Wis. 2004) (striking down Wisconsin compacts).
208 The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians sued the United States
Attorney for the Western District of Michigan in 1996 to enjoin federal actions to shut
down the Turtle Creek Casino. While the suit was pending, the Band was not be able to
borrow money for use in support of the Turtle Creek facility except by paying much higher
interest rates, stifling the Band's ability to expand its operations. Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Att'y., 46 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Mich. 1999);
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Att'y., 198 F. Supp.
2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004). See Interview with John F.
Petoskey, General Counsel, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (Nov.
22, 2005).
209 See, e.g., Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, 798 N.E.2d at 1055-57; Dairy-
land Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, No. 01-2906, 2003 WL 24124290, at *9 (Wis. Cir.
Feb. 11, 2003).
210 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 205.
211 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a).
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to several exceptions.2"2 The litigation over these exceptions can be la-
beled the "after-acquired wave" of litigation." 3 The question of off-reserva-
tion gaming derives from the exceptions to the prohibition of gaming on
lands acquired after the enactment of IGRA.1 4
IGRA's imbalance served as the catalyst for other alleged problems
on the agenda of the 109th Congress. Congress has focused on off-reserva-
tion gaming issues, tribal lobbying matters, the taking of land into trust
for gaming purposes," 5 and the regulation of Indian gaming.21 6 To protect
their interests from this agenda, tribes have spent millions of dollars on
lobbyists and political donations in efforts to preserve current gaming mar-
kets, exclude competing interests from their gaming markets, and expand
or create gaming markets.11 7
212 25 U.S.C. §§ 2719(a)(1), 2719(b)(l)(A), 2719(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (exceptions for lands
located within or contiguous to the reservation, for secretarial and gubernatorial approval,
for settlement of a land claim, for an initial reservation, and for a restored tribe or restored
lands).
213 See, e.g., TOMAC, 433 F.3d 852, 856 (restoring tribe exception); City of Roseville,
348 F.3d at 1032 (restoring lands exception); Oregon v. Norton, 271 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1280
(D.Or. 2003) (restoring lands exception); Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 939-40 (restoring tribe, restoring lands exception); Citizens
Exposing Truth About Casinos, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27498, at *13-*15 (restoring tribe,
restoring lands exception); TOMAC v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 182, 193-94 (D.D.C. 2002)
(restoring tribe, restoring lands exception); Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua
& Siuslaw Indians v. Babbitt, 116 F.Supp.2d 155, 164 (D.D.C. 2000) (clarifying meaning
of "restoration" and remanding for reconsideration of entitlement to restoration of lands
exception); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 2d
699, 706-07 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (restoring tribe, restoring lands exception), vacated on
other grounds, 288 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2002).
214 See, e.g., Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. United States, 136 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 1998);
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United States, 110 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997); Wy-
andotte Nation v. Sebelius, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Kan. 2004); Sokaogon Chippewa
Cmty. v. Babbitt, 929 F. Supp. 1165 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
215 The taking of land into trust by the Secretary of the Interior is a method for expand-
ing gaming to off-reservation areas-although one that has limited utility in the real world.
This is due in part to the "rigorous" hurdle faced by the tribes in convincing the Secretary
to take land into trust, and is evidenced by the small number of instances in which tribes
have successfully convinced the Secretary to acquire land in trust for gaming purposes. See
Letter from James E. Cason, Associate Deputy Secretary, Dept. of the Interior, to Hon. Ron
Suppah, Chairman, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon 1-2
(May 20, 2005) [hereinafter Cason Letter] (on file with author); Oversight Hearing on
Taking Land Into Trust: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 2-3
(May 18, 2005) (Prepared Statement of George T. Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Indian Affairs) [hereinafter George Skibine November Testimony], available at
http://indian.senate.gov/2005hrgs/051805hrg/skibine.pdf ("During [the George W. Bush]
administration, the Secretary has approved eight applications to take land into trust that
have qualified under these various exceptions to the gaming prohibition..."); Glenn Coin,
Oneida's Request Sizeable; Tribe's Application Wants 17,310 Acres in Federal Trust, POST-
STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Nov. 13, 2005, at B 1, available at LEXIS, Allnews ("It's not
uncommon for the BIA to take up to 10 years to rule on trust applications, said Donald
Laverdure, an Indian law professor at Michigan State University.").
216 See supra notes 1, 4-8 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Trial Lobbying Matters: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
109th Cong. 1 (June 22, 2005) (statement of Amy Moritz Ridenour) (describing the lobby-
ing activities of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians), available at http://indian.senate.
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The focus on off-reservation gaming misses the point. If Indian tribes
had the ability to force states to negotiate in good faith, they would not
need to expend millions of dollars on lobbyists such as Jack Abramoff
and Michael Scanlon. 218 Nor would tribes need to seek quality time with
powerful politicians and lobbyists such as former Representative Tom
DeLay, Grover Norquist, and Ralph Reed.21 9 If Indian tribes could force
states to negotiate gaming compacts, they would be less inclined to ex-
ploit class II gaming in attempts to expand revenue streams when facing
states that stonewall class III gaming compacts. 220 All parties involved
would benefit from a more cooperative approach, which would protect and
promote the interests of the tribes as well as the interests of state, federal,
and local governments.
III. TOWARD BALANCE: A PRACTICAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Attempting to amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act invites a re-
peat of the years of feverish lobbying and political games that led up to
the 1988 Act. 22' Now that Indian gaming revenues approach $20 billion a
year,222 the stakes are far higher than they were in 1988.223 As argued above,
amending the Act to remedy only the problems in the current law for In-
dian tribes, namely the Seminole Tribe problem, is not a viable political
option. Even the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, led by supporters of
gove/2005hrgs/062205hrg/ridenour.pdf.
218 See generally Plea Agreement & Attachment, United States v. Abramoff, No. 06-
00001 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2006), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/abramoff/
usabrmffl0306plea.pdf; Plea Agreement & Attachment, United States v. Scanlon, No. 05-
411 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.indianz.com/docs/scanlonl12105a.pdf
and http://www.indianz.com/docs/scanlon12105b.pdf; Oversight Hearing on In Re Trial
Lobbying Matters, et al.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (Nov. 2,
2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/ senate/senatel3chl09.html; Oversight
Hearing on In Re Trial Lobbying Matters, et al.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 109th Cong. (June 22, 2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate
13chl09.html; Kathryn R. L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, Don't Punish Tribes for
Abramoff, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Jan.18, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 938601.
219 See Bill Marsh, In Power and Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, § 4, at 14.
220 See generally Oversight Hearing on In Re Trial Lobbying Matters, et al.: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (Apr. 27, 2005) (statement of Philip N.
Hogen, Chairman, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm.), available at http://indian.senate.gov/
2005hrgs/042705hrg/hogen.pdf; id. (prepared statement of Kevin K. Washburn, Associate
Professor, U. of Minn. Law School), available at http://indian.senate.gov/2005hrgs/042705
hrg/washburn.pdf [hereinafter Washburn April Testimony]; Staudenmeier & Lynch, infra
note 288.
221 See generally Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13.
222 See Press Release, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, National Indian Gaming Commis-
sion Announces Indian Gaming Revenue for 2004 (July 13, 2005), available at http://www.
nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleasesfPR17072005/tabid/163/Default.aspx (reporting $19.4
billion in revenues).
223 See S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 2 (1988) (In the hearings leading to the enactment of
IGRA, "it was determined that collectively, [tribal] games generate more than $100 million
in annual revenue to tribes.").
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Indian sovereignty such as Senator McCain, does not consider such a
Seminole Tribe fix to be worth discussing.224 Accordingly, a major over-
haul of the Act to restore the balance of IGRA must include concessions
by both Indian tribes and the states to be politically viable. As an exam-
ple, national power players like the states of California and Connecticut
must be persuaded that any re-balancing of IGRA will protect their reve-
nue streams. This Article proposes such a balanced solution.
First, to recognize the practice and reality of tribal-state gaming com-
pacting in the post-Seminole Tribe world, Congress should ratify all ex-
isting revenue sharing agreements contained in class II gaming compacts
through the exercise of the Interstate Commerce Clause2 5 where the con-
cerned tribal party consents via a valid tribal legislative resolution. In addi-
tion, Congress should authorize tribes, the states, and local units of gov-
ernment to engage in future revenue sharing that meets the broad outlines
and limitations articulated by the Department of the Interior. Second, as a
concession to tribes, Congress should ratify the current procedure con-
tained in 25 C.F.R. Part 291 and authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
promulgate amendments as necessary. Third, as a concession to states and
local governments, Congress should mandate that future class III gaming
compacts provide for revenue sharing with state and local governments.
The revenue sharing should be governed by a formula that allows each
government (state, federal, and tribal) to collect an amount equivalent to
what it would have collected had the tribal gaming operations been within
state jurisdiction. Fourth, as a concession to the federal government and
as an acknowledgment of the technological realities of gaming, Congress
could create a class 11-Plus category of gaming that would include class
II gaming aided by technology and that would be subject to the new revenue
sharing rules. This modification would reflect the fact that the distinction
between class II and class III gaming has become obsolete and superficial.
A. Ratify Current Revenue Sharing Agreements
After Seminole Tribe, the tribes and the states entered into revenue
sharing agreements that varied state-by-state, with politicians, advocates,
and negotiators on both sides relying upon the tenuous legal validity of
the agreements226 to move forward with gaming operations.22 In the dec-
ade that has passed since Seminole Tribe, dozens of tribes have been able
224 In fact, the last time the Committee discussed Seminole Tribe at any length appears
to have been in 1996, right after the Court handed down the decision. See Hearing on Re-
view of Court Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. (May
9, 1996).
225 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.226 See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
227 See National Congress of American Indians, Gaming Compacts, http://www.ncai.org/
GamingCompacts. 103.0.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2005).
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to enter into class III gaming compacts after making significant conces-
sions to states. Some gaming compacts, especially those in Connecticut
and Michigan, are even older and are actually the products of litigation,
228
yet are still in jeopardy of being invalidated. Ratifying these compacts
would protect the settled expectations of the parties by eliminating the
possibility that litigation might upset their arrangements.
For the beneficiaries of these agreements-states, local governments,
tribes, tribal members, lenders, and so on-the potential legal invalidity of
revenue sharing is an underappreciated concern. Only one court, the Ninth
Circuit, has spoken on the legality of these agreements, upholding them
on the basis that the State of California offered "meaningful concessions
in return for fee demands. ' ' 229 Assuming that this standard accords with
the purposes of IGRA, which the Ninth Circuit also considered, 230 it is far
from clear that all compacts would survive that test. The Wisconsin com-
pacts from the early 1990s, with their set fee structure not expressly tied to a
particular purpose, 231 or the New Mexico compacts that Secretary Babbitt
criticized 23 2 might be vulnerable. Compacts in other states, such as Michi-
gan, that relied upon the allowance of a significant exclusive gaming market
likely would survive. 233
But it is not certain that other jurisdictions would adopt such a test
in deciding a case challenging the validity of revenue sharing in class III
compacts. Some courts could adopt a test that would validate the revenue
sharing agreements as long as they follow the purposes of IGRA234-- a broad
test under which many compacts would survive--while other courts could
adopt a narrow test relying on the plain language of the statute. 235 Under
such a narrow test, it is possible that no revenue sharing provision would
survive except the 1993 Michigan compacts entered into through a con-
sent judgment in federal court. 23 6 This uncertainty regarding the validity
22 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 57-58 (noting the gaming compact reached by
Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequot Nation after the Nation successfully sued the
State in 1989); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, No. 1:90 CV 611
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 1993) (stipulation for entry of consent judgment), available at http://
www.michigan.gov/documents/SSM-v-Engler_- StipConsent_706197.pdf (noting the com-
pact reached between Michigan and seven tribes as part of the settlement of a "good faith"
lawsuit against the State and its governor, John Engler, in 1993).
229 In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003).
230 See id. at 1111 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000)).
231 See Amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and
the State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992 6(A) (1998), available at http://www.ncai.
org/ncai/resource/agreementswi-gaming-forest-county-potawatomi-community-amendment.
pdf.
232 See Babbitt Letter, supra note 158.
233 See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 271 F.3d 235, 237 (6th
Cir. 2001).
234 See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000).
235 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (2000).
236 See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, No. 1:90 CV 611 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 20, 1993) (stipulation for entry of consent judgment), available at http://www.
michigan.gov/documents/SSM-v-Engler-Stip-Consent-70619-7.pdf.
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of revenue sharing agreements is destabilizing and detrimental to Indian
gaming in many respects.
Given the "trend" of states and tribes locating Indian gaming farther
away from Indian Country in order to cater to a lucrative off-reservation
gaming market and maximize the revenue for both parties to share,237 it is
more and more likely that the Secretary will decline to approve such com-
pacts-or that gaming opposition organizations will sue to declare such
compacts invalid. Secretary Babbitt allowed the New Mexico compacts,
which were part of this trend, to go through only because the Pueblos had
no other options. 3 Secretary Norton allowed the Seneca Nation compact
to go through because it was tied to a Congressional land claims settlement
act.2 139 Gaming opposition groups have no shortage of funding to contest
every off-reservation gaming operation.2 40 In the face of such challenges,
all gaming compacts, regardless of whether it involves off-reservation gam-
ing, are threatened by the possibility of a court not limiting its decision
to its facts.24
1
This Article's proposal would also allow tribes to "opt-out" of ratifica-
tion protection for their gaming compact revenue sharing arrangement.
This provision would protect the choices of the tribal sovereign, especially
2317 See Martin Testimony, supra note 146, at 3; George Skibine November Testimony,
supra note 215, at 3.
238 See Press Release, Statement of Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt on the New
Mexico Gaming Compacts (Aug. 23, 1997), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/archives/
indnmcom.html ("The legislatively mandated compacts ippear to put New Mexico tribes in
an untenable situation. On one hand, they are expected to agree to a number of burdensome
conditions that go well beyond the scope of any of the 161 compacts that are now approved
between states and tribes in this country. On the other hand, if the tribes do not agree to
these conditions or if the compacts are disapproved, existing gaming establishments may
be threatened with closure, causing immediate and enormous economic hardship.").
239 See Norton Letter, supra note 169, at 2 ("I have concluded that this Compact ap-
propriately permits gaming on the subject lands because Congress has expressly provided
for the Nation to acquire certain lands pursuant to the Settlement Act.").
240 E.g., Susan Erler, Michigan Indian Tribe Protest Casino Consultant's Fee, TIMES
(Munster, Ind.), Dec. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 12794117 ("In a show of protest
Tuesday, Potawatomi Indian tribe members presented a mock $5 million check to a con-
sultant whose job was to stall the tribe's planned casino in New Buffalo, Mich. Kevin
Flynn had been hired as a consultant by Boyd Gaming Corp. as part of a $273.5 million
agreement in 1999 for Boyd to buy Blue Chip Casino LLC. The terms of the contract
called for Flynn, who'd previously been chief executive officer of Blue Chip, to be paid
$5 million, in addition to a $500,000 yearly consulting fee, if the Pokagon Band of Po-
tawatomi Indians failed to open a casino by the time the contract expired on Tuesday.");
Brief of Non-Federal Appellees 4, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d
852 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("This case is one of several protracted efforts by TOMAC, spanning
six years, to stall or thwart Indian gaming opportunities in Michigan. In 1999, the same
year TOMAC initiated its various litigation efforts to stop the Band's efforts to pursue
gaming under IGRA, a large gambling company, facing competitive threats from, the Tribe's
New Buffalo casino, initiated an enterprise, involving the payment of over $5 million, to
delay the Tribe for five years.").
241 See generally Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and Indian Adjudication:
An Essay on the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REv.
543 (1985) (discussing the Court's tendency toward a universalist approach in Indian af-
fairs and the benefits of a more tribal-specific approach).
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those that have been exploited by the states. Those tribes that choose not
to approve the congressional ratification process would continue operat-
ing under the current gaming compacts, subject to the current law. It is
possible that many tribes would refuse to follow the congressional ratifica-
tion process. To allow tribes the greatest flexibility in choosing to opt into
this procedure, there should be no deadline for adopting resolutions that
allow Congress to ratify a compact.
Congress should authorize future compacts that include revenue shar-
ing provisions meeting the "substantial exclusivity" test now followed by
the Department of the Interior in analyzing the prohibition on state taxes
and fees.242 The Department has defined "substantial exclusivity" to mean
"where a compact provides a tribe with substantial economic benefits in
the form of a right to conduct class III gaming activities that are on more
favorable terms than any rights of non-Indians to conduct similar gaming
activities in the state.2 143 Moreover, Congress should adopt the Department's
analysis of when a state's regulatory fee structure is too onerous to be valid
under the current incarnation of IGRA. That test states that regulatory
fees should be audited to ensure that "the payments [to the state or other
government] actually match the cost of regulation. .". ."' If a tribe and a
state cannot negotiate a revenue sharing agreement meeting these criteria,
the tribe would be free to invoke the secretarial procedure in Part 291.
B. Ratify the Secretarial Procedure
The Secretary of the Interior intended the secretarial procedure codified
at 25 C.F.R. Part 291 after the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe to pre-
vent a state's "veto over IGRA's dispute resolution system [and the re-
sulting] stalemate [to] the compacting process. 2 45 The Department noted
that some states had "signaled their intention to assert immunity to any suit
in Federal court. 24 6 The purpose of the secretarial procedure was to "end
the stalemate. 247
Part 291 "tracks IGRA's negotiation and mediation process, adjusted
only to the extent necessary to reflect the unavailability of tribal access to
142 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(A), 2710(d)(4) (2000).
243 Norton Letter, supra note 169, at 3; see also Babbitt Letter, supra note 158 (defining
"substantial exclusivity" to mean "completely prohibit[ing] non-Indian gaming from com-
peting with Indian gaming, or when all payments cease while the State permits competition
to take place"); Martin Testimony, supra note 146, at 2 (noting that "substantial exclusiv-
ity" requires that a state confer a "valuable economic benefit" on the tribe and that pay-
ments to the state or local governments are "appropriate in light of the benefit conferred on
the tribe").
244 Babbitt Letter, supra note 158.
245 Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17535, 17536 (Apr. 12, 1999) (codified
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291).
2461d.
247 td.
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Federal court where a State refuses to waive sovereign immunity." '248 The
procedure requires the tribes to follow five major steps. First, where a state
raises sovereign immunity as a defense to a tribal suit brought in accor-
dance with IGRA2 49 and that suit is dismissed by the court,25° the tribe must
request the Department of the Interior to establish gaming procedures.25" '
The request must comply with a host of requirements to be eligible for
the issuance of class III gaming procedures252 and then the Secretary must
notify the tribe whether the request met the requirements.253 Upon a de-
termination by the Secretary that the tribe is eligible for the procedures,25 4
the Secretary must seek from the State comments on the proposed proce-
dures and alternative procedures. 55 If the State does not object, then the
Secretary may approve the proposed class III gaming procedures.256 If the
State does object, the Secretary must appoint a mediator to mediate the
disputes or disagreements between the tribe and the State,257 The Secretary
must then approve the mediated class III gaming procedures or reject the
mediator's proposed procedures and adopt his or her own.258
As the Secretary intended, these procedures track the current provi-
sions of IGRA as much as possible where the federal court dismisses a
tribal claim and removes itself from the process.25 9 Congressional authoriza-
tion and ratification of these procedures would require a state to concede
to a class III gaming compact, but the state would retain the discretion to
choose whether a federal court will be involved by reserving to the state
the choice of whether to invoke sovereign immunity or consent to suit.
Where a state chooses to follow the current IGRA dispute resolution track,
the court would first make a "good faith" determination.260 Where a state
chooses to raise its immunity defense, the secretarial procedure would
dispense with the "good faith" determination26" ' and, it appears, shorten
248 Id.
249 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) (2000); Class III Gaming Procedures, 25 C.F.R. § 291.2(b)
(2006).
250 Class III Gaming Procedures, 25 C.F.R. § 291.3(e) (2006).
251 Id. § 291.3(a).
252 Id. § 291.4.253Id. § 291.6.254 Id. § 291.6(b).
255 Class III Gaming Procedures, 25 C.F.R. § 291.7 (2006).
2561d. § 291.8(b)(1).
2571d. § 291.10.258 1d. § 291.11.
259 Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17535, 17536 (Apr. 12, 1999) (codified
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291) ("The rule tracks IGRA's negotiation and mediation process, adjusted
only to the extent necessary to reflect the unavailability of tribal access to Federal court
where a State refuses to waive sovereign immunity.").
260 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (2000).
21 See Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. at 17537 (Apr. 12, 1999) (codified
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291) ("The final regulation eliminates the requirement that the Secretary
make a finding on the 'good faith' issue.").
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the process considerably. Both the current IGRA mechanism and the sec-
retarial procedure lead to a mediation process.1
62
Though the secretarial procedure is an onerous, lawyer-intensive
venture, it is an effective restoration of the dispute resolution mechanism
that Congress intended the tribes and the states to follow when it enacted
IGRA. Congress made clear that it "sought to preserve the principles which
have guided the evolution of Federal-Indian law for over 150 years. 263
One of those principles is the "long- and well-established principle of Fed-
eral-Indian law ... that unless authorized by an act of Congress, the ju-
risdiction of state governments and the application of state laws do not
extend to Indian lands.' '2' An important corollary of this principle is the no-
tion that "tribal governments retain all rights that were not expressly re-
linquished. ' 65
Building upon that principle, Congress intended that the only mecha-
nism in IGRA that would allow a state to exercise its will in Indian Country
would be a tribal-state compact that required an affirmative act of con-
sent by the concerned tribe to state authority or jurisdiction. 266 The only
"veto" Congress intended states to have is located within the Gubernato-
rial concurrence provision in the secretarial determination exception to the
general prohibition on "off-reservation" gaming. 67 Since Seminole Tribe
disrupted that scheme, a state-indirectly--can assert its will over an Indian
tribe and prevent the tribe from conducting class III gaming if it chooses
to raise its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Congressional ratification and
authorization of the secretarial procedures restores the original intent of
Congress in enacting IGRA.
A contextual view of the legislative history behind IGRA supports this
view. Cabazon Band involved gaming that Congress would label as class
II gaming-high stakes bingo and some card games.2 68 Because of the Ca-
bazon Band decision, anti-gaming constituencies had conceded the battle
over which sovereign would have primary regulatory authority over class
II gaming. 69 At the time of the final legislative push toward the passage of
26 2 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)-(vii) (2000); 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.10-11 (2006).
263 S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 5 (1988).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 See id. at 6 ("The mechanism for facilitating the unusual relationship in which a tribe
might affirmatively seek the extension of State jurisdiction and the application of state
laws to activities conducted on Indian land is a tribal-State compact. In no instance, does
[IGRA] contemplate the extension of State jurisdiction or the application of State laws for
any other purpose.").
267 See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(I)(A); George Skibine November Testimony, supra note
215, at 3 ("[Under § 2719(b)(l)(A)l, by requiring that the Governor of the affected state con-
cur in the Secretary's determination, the statute acknowledges that in a difference of opin-
ion between a sovereign tribe and a state, the state prevails.").
268 480 U.S. 202, 204-05 (1987); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A) (2000).
269 See Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13, at 28 ("The opposing forces had pretty
much concluded that they had lost the class 1I argument...
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IGRA, Congress had to make a decision on casino-style gaming and the
Johnson Act.27 ° The Johnson Act prohibited slot machines and other gam-
ing devices on Indian lands.27" ' As Frank Ducheneaux and Pete Taylor wrote,
"although casino gaming had not yet become a major part of the Indian
gaming scene, a few tribes had developed operations [by 1988] that would
be class III under the pending legislation and other tribes saw definite
possibilities in casino gaming.'"272 The tribes sought a waiver from the
Johnson Act in the pending legislation that would become IGRA.273 Con-
gress could have banned class III gaming by simply not providing the
Johnson Act waiver the tribes sought. It did not choose this option, but
rather provided the waiver and left class III ganing as an option for tribes in
eligible states.
274
The negotiations leading to the final bill "were often tense, volatile,
and acrimonious. On more than one occasion, a party would threaten to walk
out and the process was near collapse.."275 Given that IGRA was adopted
in this strongly contested environment, the original balance fought for and
achieved by the parties and intended by Congress to be preserved by the
statute, should be maintained.
In Senate Report No. 446, the Committee wrote that it "ha[d] care-
fully considered the law enforcement concerns of tribal and State gov-
ernments, as well as those of the Federal Government, and the need to
fashion a means by which differing public policies of these respective
governmental entities can be accommodated and reconciled. This legisla-
tion is intended to provide a means by which tribal and State governments
can realize their unique and individual governmental objectives .... ,26
The Committee also acknowledged "the strong tribal opposition to any
imposition of State jurisdiction over activities on Indian lands." '277 More-
over, the Committee recognized that "[a] tribe's governmental interests in-
clude raising revenues to provide governmental services for the benefit of
the tribal community and reservation residents, promoting public safety as
well as law and order on tribal lands, realizing the objectives of economic
self-sufficiency and Indian self-determination, and regulating activities of
persons within its jurisdictional borders." '78 This legislative history makes
clear that Congress intended to eliminate the federal barriers to class III
gaming while allowing the states a role on the class III compacting proc-
270 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178.
271 15 U.S.C. § 1175(a) (2000).
272 Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13, at 28.
273 See id. ("Some of the tribes and their congressional supporters thought that it might
be possible to include a waiver of the Johnson Act in any legislative compromise.").
274 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(6) (2000).
275 Id. at 29.
276 S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 6 (1988).
277 Id. at 13.
278 Id.
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ess.279 The secretarial procedure fulfills this intent and therefore should
be ratified.
While the secretarial procedure has been invoked, it has never been
concluded due to state challenges. 280 As a result, the tribes and the states
cannot have settled expectations concerning this process. No tribe and state
have reached an agreement concerning a gaming compact or begun gam-
ing operations after completing the procedure. One could argue that if
Congress were to revamp this area, there would be no reason to keep the
onerous structure of mediators and proposed gaming procedures. But this
suggestion forgets the "tense, volatile, and acrimonious" negotiations lead-
ing to the creation of the structure in the first place.2 1' It is worthwhile to
maintain but modify the existing structure rather than "starting from
scratch"-a process that, if the 1980s are any gauge, would take years of
difficult and costly negotiation.
The first two elements of this legislative proposal return tribes and
states to a situation much like that which existed before Seminole Tribe,
but that is not the upshot of this proposal. Request for a return to the days
of IGRA before Seminole Tribe is a common refrain heard from tribal advo-
cates and legal commentators, 28 2 and it is similar to the calls from tribes
heard by Senator McCain in the 1980s for "no legislation. ' 283 As a politi-
cal matter, too much time has passed since 1996 for states and even some
tribes to accept a "Back to the Future" package of legislation. The following
two elements are intended to even the balance in a manner viable to all
parties-tribal, state, and federal.
C. Mandate Revenue Sharing in Future Compacts
This element of the proposal requires all class III gaming compacts
to include revenue sharing provisions with states and local units of gov-
ernment. To address the off-reservation impacts of tribal gaming and the
so-called "lost revenue ' '2 4 that state and local governments articulate in
279 See id. at 13-14.
280 See Martin Testimony, supra note 146, at 2.
281 Ducheneaux & Taylor, supra note 13, at 29.
282 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
283 See S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 33 (1988). See generally 151 CONG. REC. S13389
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain).
284 "Lost revenue" refers to tax revenue that states and local units of government ex-
pected to generate but for the rights and expressions of sovereignty by tribal governments.
See, e.g., Fred Grimm, Jeb Should've Told Seminoles to Deal Us In, MIAMI HERALD, June
21, 2005, at B 1, available at 2005 WLNR 23048561 ("Some seven years (and $1.6 billion
in lost revenue) later, Gov. Bush is going into negotiations with a Seminole operation that
now takes in a billion dollars a year-a quarter of that pure, sweet profit. Those profits aren't
being taxed. Nor does the casino open its books to state auditors or allow pesky state bu-
reaucrats to regulate their games."); Editorial, Broad Casino Opposition, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS (Mich.), June 19, 2005, at D12, available at 2005 WLNR 9811533 ("Kalamazoo's
Economic Development Corporation and the Grand Rapids Chamber of Commerce oppose
the casino because of the negative economic impact it will have on West Michigan. This
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their opposition to Indian gaming, revenue sharing that alleviates these
concerns would be mandated. Congress should place the burden on states
and local units of government to prove the "lost revenue" and off-
reservation impacts of gaming in measurable monetary amounts. Tribes
with gaming facilities that do not generate a significant amount of reve-
nue, a threshold to be determined by Congress, would be exempt from reve-
nue sharing. Tribes with large revenue streams would be required to pay
no more than twenty-five percent of "net win," as they presently do in
Connecticut.285
Such a mandatory revenue sharing provision would eliminate a ma-
jority of the negotiating points that currently consume states and tribes in
their compact negotiations. This would greatly reduce the transaction
costs of reaching agreements and eliminate the nasty "crossover" negoti-
ating tactics, such as making treaty rights and tax agreements contingent
upon gaming, which have been employed in some states. The cap on reve-
nue sharing precludes states from recovering an unfair windfall while the
floor allows modest gaming operations to continue to benefit reservation
communities. States that see Indian gaming as a potential source of reve-
nue for reducing budget shortfalls-creating resentment by tribes-would
be less inclined to use that tactic.
A key provision is the requirement that local units of government re-
ceive a share of the revenue as well. Some revenue sharing agreements,
such as those in Connecticut, shortchange the towns and counties in the
revenue sharing formula, creating local resentment against the tribes.286 It
is, after all, the local governments that respond first to emergencies at the
tribal casino and feel the impact of increased commercial traffic in the area
resulting from successful gaming operations. Tribes sharing revenue with
local units of government, as a general matter, have a much better rela-
tionship with local government.287
'big hurt' will be especially severe in the surrounding counties-particularly Kalamazoo and
Kent-which will be the biggest losers due to lost jobs, lost productivity and lost reve-
nue."). Contra Tom Wilemon, Indians Face Steep Odds, Says Keynoter; Former Senator
Rails Against Schwarzenegger, SUN HERALD (BILOXI, MIss.), May 5, 2005, at Al, avail-
able at 2005 WLNR 22894375 ("[Ben Nighthorse] Campbell expressed his displeasure at
having read in newspaper accounts comments about Indians 'not paying their fair share' or
'ripping us off.' 'I would say that's a comment made by somebody who has just got off the
boat and doesn't understand the history of what has happened to Indians in California,'
Sen. Campbell said. 'They paid for their lifestyle in blood, lost relatives, millions of acres
of lost land, untold billions of dollars in lost revenue from what's under the land-oil, gas,
coal and so on .... They've paid their dues, Mr. Schwarzenegger."').
285 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 70.
286 See Jessica Durkin, Foxwoods Reaches Milestone; It Has Sent More Than $2 Billion
to State, NORWICH BULL. (Conn.), Feb. 16, 2005, at Al ("The billions may be good news
for Hartford and the tribe, but officials from locally affected towns are fighting for a larger
share of the slot take. They maintain the two host towns of Montville and Ledyard and
three 'impact' towns of Norwich, Preston and North Stonington are not getting a fair dis-
tribution of revenue from the highly successful gambling venues outside their back door.").
287 See supra note 152.
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An additional benefit to the cap on revenue sharing is that states and
tribes would be less inclined to seek gaming markets closer to non-Indian
urban communities. The states would not receive the massive windfalls
predicted from gaming and would be less inclined to encourage tribes to
expand their gaming operations. Similarly, tribes would have less incen-
tive to seek off-reservation gaming opportunities if they were guaranteed a
greater minimum share of the gaming revenues generated from their ex-
isting lands. This would alleviate a great deal of the resentment building
against Indian gaming and thus confer a significant benefit.
D. Reclassify Technology-Aided Class H Gaming as Class H-Plus
Finally, assuming Congress adopts the first three elements of this pro-
posal, there would be no reason not to reclassify technology-aided class
II devices. States and tribes would share the revenue from such devices in
accordance with a class III compact (or a class II-Plus compact).
The so-called "Class II Gaming Debate" '288 arose out of two types of
circumstances that excluded some tribes from class III gaming. First, some
states prohibited all forms of class III gaming, rendering tribes located in
those states ineligible for class III gaming compacts. 289 Second, some
states that did allow class III gaming refused to negotiate compacts.2 90 How-
ever, no gaming compact is necessary for class II gaming. 91 As a result,
the stalemates created by states refusing to negotiate or by states prohib-
iting all forms of class III gaming encouraged tribes to seek increasingly
valuable forms of class II gaming. Today, some technology-aided class II
games are practically indistinguishable from class III games. 292
This trend has created substantial problems that have attracted the at-
tention of Congress. As Professor and former NIGC General Counsel
Kevin Washburn testified recently:
The Department of Justice's persistent, unsuccessful attempts to
apply the Johnson Act to Class II 'technological aids' . . . causes
prudent gaming companies to stay out of that market .... As a
288 Heidi McNeil Staudenmeier & Andrew D. Lynch, The Class II Gaming Debate: The
Johnson Act vs. the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 74 Miss. L.J. 843 (2004).
289 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000); Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians
v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 99 F.3d 321 (1996) (holding that
where the State does not permit other forms of gambling, it need not negotiate gaming com-
pacts with Indian tribes).
290 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
291 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2000).
292 See, e.g., Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d
1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 2003) ("The video screen depicts a grid that is similar in appearance
to that of a slot machine."); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 324 F.3d 607, 610
(8th Cir. 2003) ("At trial, the following evidence was adduced regarding the Lucky Tab II
machines. First, the instruments look and sound very much like traditional slot ma-
chines.").
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result, the companies with the largest involvement in Class II
tribal gaming are those that are willing to tread close to the thin
line separating lawful and unlawful gaming. This approach has
rewarded these companies with extraordinary profits that would
not be available in a market with full and open competition. These
profits have come at the expense of Indian tribes whose choices
of business partners are constrained by the Department of Jus-
tice's actions and threatened actions. 293
Classifying class II technological aids as class II gaming allows
tribes to sidestep the bargaining process intended to govern the estab-
lishment of class III-like gaming and encourages continued federal and
state efforts to stop such gaming. Classifying class II technological aids as
class II-Plus gaming (or even class III gaming) under a scheme where
states could not bar all class III gaming compacts and where states could
share in the revenue would solve these problems in a manner sufficient to
satisfy all governmental constituents.
E. Summary
The four-part legislative proposal offers notable benefits for the tribes,
the states, and the federal government, while preserving the settled ex-
pectations of the parties. Moreover, the proposal will serve to stifle a grow-
ing backlash against Indian gaming that can be traced to the imbalance
within IGRA.
IV. BRINGING BALANCE TO INDIAN GAMING
The four-part legislative proposal would restore balance to the post-
Seminole Tribe IGRA. The Seminole Tribe decision handed down in 1996
generated tribal furor because, in the years following IGRA's enactment
in 1988, so many tribes had become accustomed to being able to rely on
the Act's federal court remedy when facing states that refused to negoti-
ate in good faith. 294 The proposal in this Article recognizes that both states
and tribes have ten years of experience and concrete agreements relating
to class III gaming in the post-Seminole Tribe world. As a result, this
proposal is not intended to disrupt those positive expectations and crea-
tive solutions.
This four-part legislative proposal is an experiment in balancing the
interests of the two sovereigns with the largest stake in Indian gaming-
293 Washburn April Testimony, supra note 220, at 9-10.
294 See, e.g., Hearing on Review of Court Decision on Indian Gambling Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. 364 (1996) (prepared statement of W. Ron Allen,
President, National Congress of American Indians) ("The Seminole decision will have
significant impacts on the conduct of Indian gaming in the short run.").
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states and tribes. It is designed both to achieve a middle ground between
eviscerating either side's sovereign rights and to ameliorate the national
backlash against off-reservation gaming. To achieve the balance, Indian
tribal interests would accept reduced authorization to engage in off-reserva-
tion gaming in exchange for improved authorization to engage in class III
and class II-Plus gaming. Conversely, states would accept increased class
III and class II-Plus gaming in exchange for reduced expansion of off-
reservation gaming. Overarching these compromises are the benefits both
states and tribes will enjoy from explicit authorization and ratification of
revenue sharing agreements.
A. Preserving Tribal Sovereignty
Indian gaming is not the product of greed or loose morals. It is the
product of desperation on the part of Indian people neglected and abused
by centuries of federal, state, and local governments. 95 Indian tribes be-
gan gaming operations to raise money to pay for critical governmental ser-
vices.2 96 Congress recognized this in the very language of IGRA.2 97 A con-
comitant goal of IGRA was preserving tribal government revenues in order
to support the development of tribal government structures and political
stability.298 Any attorney working in Indian law in 1980 would likely at-
test that they never expected tribal governments to build and fund their
own schools, homes, health clinics, law enforcement and public safety
facilities, and other governmental structures. The advances that have been
made by tribal governments derive almost exclusively from Indian gam-
ing.2 9 The legislative proposal here recognizes and advances the goals of
tribal governments and of IGRA by expanding opportunities for class III
and class II-Plus gaming.
295 See PAUL PASQUARETTA, GAMBLING AND SURVIVAL IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA
163-64 (2003) ("Working within a system that was largely devised to confine, limit, and
destroy them, [Indians] have found ways to reclaim lost territories, position themselves in
politically advantageous ways, and resist outside dominance .... [lI]t is important to recog-
nize that gambling is not simply a pathological response to perceived powerlessness, but a
natural human response to the inherent chaos of living."); Rand & Light Testimony, supra
note 6, at 9 ("A gaming tribe simply is not Enron, nor is it MGM Mirage or Harrah's Enter-
tainment.").
296 See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. U. S. Att'y for
the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 F.3d 960
(6th Cir. 2004).
297See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 13 (1988) ("A tribe's governmental interests include
raising revenues to provide governmental services for the benefit of the tribal community
and reservation residents .... ").
298 See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000) (naming Indian gaming "as a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments").
299 Cf. Rand & Light Testimony, supra note 6, at 7 ("That Native Americans have as-
sumed such a prominent place in non-tribal public and policy discourse is almost entirely
an artifact of Indian gaming.").
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Indian gaming is also the product of legal and political choices made
by the states.3" One authority has argued that states could have stopped
Indian gaming in its tracks at any time but chose not to take that action.30'
Many state and local governments rely upon the revenues derived from
Indian gaming.3"' In addition to receiving revenue shares, state and local
governments benefit from increased income and sales tax revenues and
from decreased welfare burdens.3"3 Further, local communities benefit from
improved tribal public safety services,3" and both local and national busi-
nesses benefit from expanded market opportunities. 5
Arguably related to tribal sovereignty concerns is the continued op-
portunity for tribes to seek "off-reservation" gaming operations. Many tribes
located far from urban areas have modest or even failing gaming opera-
tions, or no operations at all, due to market conditions.30 6 Tribes who fit
this category and who are seeking but are currently unable to reach gam-
ing markets will not be helped by this proposal. But, since only a few
very fortunate tribes have been able to convince state, local, and federal
policymakers to approve an off-reservation gaming operation,3 °7 these tribes
will not effectively have lost much.
Some tribes might object to the mandatory revenue sharing provisions.
Any act of Congress that requires Indian tribes to take actions to which
they might object raises questions of tribal sovereignty. However, the 1988
class III gaming compact provision was such a derogation of tribal sover-
eignty, and the tribes learned to accept it. In the twenty-first century, revenue
sharing has become a virtual requirement for class III compacts with state
governments. Thus, mandatory revenue sharing, under the reasonable terms
adopted by the Department of the Interior and in a legal environment where
class III gaming is more accessible, would not be a serious derogation of
tribal sovereignty.
300 See Washburn, supra note 94, at 295.
301 See id.
302 See Rand & Light Testimony, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that "some 30 states and
myriad non-tribal communities have [benefited from]" Indian gaming).
303 See Light et al., supra note 16, at 658 ("But Indian gaming's beneficiaries are not
limited to tribes; non-tribal jurisdictions benefit from tribal casinos, as well. On balance,
states with Indian gaming operations, as well as the numerous non-reservation communi-
ties located near tribal casinos, have realized extensive economic and social benefits from
tribal gaming operations, ranging from increased tax revenues to decreased public entitle-
ment payments to the disadvantaged. Tribal gaming assists states by promoting economic
development in underdeveloped rural areas while leveraging growth and development in
surrounding non-tribal communities.").
304 See, e.g., Letter from Michael Oltersdorf, Sheriff, Leelanau County, Mich. to George
Bennett, Chairman, Grand Traverse Band 1-2 (Sept. 1, 1998), available at http://www.ncai.
org/ncai/resource/agreements/Leelanau%20County%2Sheriff's%2Office%201etter%20S
ept.%201,%201998.pdf (noting positive cooperation with tribal police department).
303 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 83-85.
306 See Washburn, supra note 94, at 293.
307 See infra text accompanying notes 342-346.
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B. Preserving State Sovereignty
State sovereignty is a powerful tool for protecting state interests. In
cases such as Seminole Tribe, the Rehnquist Court made clear that Con-
gress has limited authority to waive state sovereignty." 8 States' rights un-
der the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments are at historic levels.3°9
Perhaps it is no surprise that tribes-historic adversaries of state govern-
ments-fared poorly in the Rehnquist Court in recent tribal-state legal
clashes. 10
Legal commentators and policymakers have voiced numerous objec-
tions to Indian gaming since the enactment of IGRA.3 ' Many commenta-
tors proposed radical revisions of IGRA that would preserve and protect
tribal sovereignty." 2 Some have even considered repealing the statute alto-
gether, which would return the state of the law to that which existed im-
mediately after Cabazon Band.313 Others seek a legislative reversal of Semi-
nole Tribe that would return the state of the law to something approximating
the original intent of Congress in enacting IGRA.31 4 Other commentators
advocate increased state authority over Indian gaming operations and in-
creased state influence over what kind of gaming is conducted in Indian
Country.3"5
No legal commentator has advocated a middle-ground, pragmatic legis-
lative reform of IGRA in the vein of this Article's proposal. Proposals
that rearrange the law far to the advantage of either states or tribes amount
to little more than shots across the bow by the opposing sides. It is little
wonder that the proposals of the legal academic community, with the possi-
ble exception of those of Professor Kevin Washburn, do not reach the ears of
the national policymakers in the Senate Indian Affairs Committee or the
House Resources Committee. 316
308 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also cases cited infra
note 317.
309 See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ, The States 'Rights Assault on Federal Authority,
in THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT, 155 (2002); DAVID H.
GETCHES, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-
Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001); DAVID H. GETCHES,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian
Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996).
310 See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
31 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
313 Cf. Donohue, supra note 24, at 325 ("A repeal of IGRA may well result in courts
returning to the pre-IGRA Cabazon prohibitory/regulatory test, in which case any state that
allows any form of gambling, including state lotteries, will be deemed regulatory and thus
unable to regulate or prohibit Indian gaming.").
314 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
3I See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
316 See Oversight Hearing on Indian Gaming: Regulation of Class III Gaming Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 13-22 (2005) (prepared statement of
Kevin K. Washburn, Associate Professor, U. of Minn. Law School); Washburn April Testi-
mony, supra note 220.
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1, General States' Rights Objections to IGRA
This Section responds to the common state sovereignty criticisms of
Indian gaming as they relate to this Article's legislative proposal. The pro-
posal keeps states' right in mind and preserves them. It provides passive
benefits and positive virtues to states. First, by not requiring the states to
take any action whatsoever, it avoids a Tenth Amendment challenge.317 Sec-
ond, because it does not attempt to repeat the IGRA state sovereign im-
munity debacle by relying upon the Interstate Commerce Clause to in-
voke yet another waiver, this proposal avoids Eleventh Amendment diffi-
culties." 8 Third, as a positive benefit, this proposal would preserve the
revenue streams created through the post-Seminole Tribe compacting proc-
ess that so often produced revenue sharing agreements. Fourth, as an-
other positive benefit, this proposal reduces the transaction costs of nego-
tiating and litigating class III gaming compacts. States and their subdivi-
sions, as well as tribes, will receive their financial benefits from Indian
gaming without having to sit through hundreds of hours of meetings, all
billed by attorneys. Fifth, states and local units of government will be com-
pensated for "lost" tax revenues, increased public expenditures, and other
impacts they can prove.
What some states will lose is the windfall of tribal money paid to them
in exchange for the right to conduct class III gaming. Those states that do
not match their demand for revenue sharing to the real cost of tribal gam-
ing will no longer be able to take more than their fair share from the tribes in
their states. States that have sought tribal revenues in order to help balance
their budgets without a concomitant increase in state expenditures or public
services in Indian Country will need to seek other sources of revenue.
States that do not allow gaming and that object to the increased tribal
opportunity to engage in class III gaming will remain free to prohibit all
forms of gaming within their borders.3 1 9 States that have already opened
the door to class III gaming by entering into compacts will likely have
missed their chance to shut it.
320
37 See, e.g., Citizens for Safer Cmtys. v. Norton, 541 U.S. 974 (2004); Nance v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.; Crow Tribe of
Indians, Mont. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United States, 259 E Supp. 2d 783, 798-99
(W.D. Wis. 2003), aff'd, 367 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 878 (2005);
Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp, 2d 167, 189-90 (D.R.I. 2003), aff'd, 432 F.3d 45 (1st Cir.
2005); City of Roseville v. Norton, 219 F. Supp 2d 130, 153-54 (D.D.C 2002), aff'd, 348
F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom.
318 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak
and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1991).
31 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 100-446, at 11 (1988) ("There are five States (Arkansas, Ha-
waii, Indiana, Mississippi, and Utah) that criminally prohibit any type of gaming, includ-
ing bingo.").
320 See Jane Gordon, Experts Doubt Repeal Can Hold, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 14
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2. Specific Objections to the Secretarial Procedure
Nicolas Goldin, predicting that the secretarial procedure would rise
in prominence, has made four arguments against the procedure from an
anti-Indian gaming point of view.32' First, "[a] unilateral decision by the
Secretary to dictate the parameters for tribal gaming would undermine the
congressional objective that underlies IGRA.'3 22 Second, "[a]llowing the
secretary to conclude that a state Governor, attorney general, and court sys-
tem do not understand the state's public policy would make a travesty of
the concept of federalism and in its place substitute a system in which Wash-
ington claims it knows best what state laws mean. 32 3 Third, "[tihe secre-
tary's inherent authority includes a responsibility to protect the interests
of Indian tribes, making it impossible for the secretary to avoid a conflict
of interest or exercise objective judgment in disputes between states and
tribes."324 Fourth, "the proposed procedure would create a disincentive for
tribes to try to resolve disagreements with uncooperative states. '
32s
The proposal here answers the concern raised about the balance cre-
ated by Congress in IGRA. Goldin would have a better point if there was
no counterbalance to the imposition of the secretarial procedure. How-
ever, under this Article's proposal, a counterbalance is provided in that states
and local units of government would receive sufficient revenue sharing from
tribal gaming operations to meet any burden that Indian gaming placed
on their governments. Goldin's concern about the underlying purpose of
IGRA-that "Congress enacted IGRA in the aftermath of Cabazon ex-
pressly because it wanted to ensure that the states play a role in the tribal
gaming regulatory process"326is not only belied by the text of IGRA,
which makes clear that IGRA was intended to benefit tribes,327 but has
also been rejected by federal courts.32 8
(Connecticut), at 5 ("'What Connecticut has done is try to close the door after all the
horses have escaped,' said Nell Jessup Newtown, dean of the University of Connecticut
School of Law and an authority on Indian law..'The great state of Connecticut permits such
gaming by an entity or organization, for any purpose. If we didn't have any tribes or the
casinos and they had repealed the Las Vegas Nights ordinance earlier, the game would be
over. But they didn't repeal it when they had the chance.").
321 See Goldin, supra note 23, at 843-44.
322 Id. at 843.
323 Id. at 843-44 (quotation marks and footnote omitted).
324 Id. at 844 (quotation marks, footnote, and brackets omitted).
325 Id. (quotation marks and footnote omitted).
326 Goldin, supra note 23, at 843.
327 See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000).
328 Some courts and commentators have asserted that a critical element of congres-
sional intent in passing IGRA was to slow or halt the spread (or proliferation) of Indian
gaming. See Ponca Tribe of Okla. v. State of Okla., 37 F.3d 1422, 1425 (10th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 517 U.S. 1129 (1996); Texas v. Ysleta del sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d 668, 681
n.6 (W.D. Tex. 2001); Goldin, supra note 23, at 824 n.200. However, this is the minority
view and has not been upheld by a court of last resort. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att'y for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920,
933 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (rejecting State of Michigan's argument that the purpose of IGRA
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Yet it is certain that, there would have been no IGRA absent strong
state political pressure, so Goldin has a point-states did want additional
authority over Indian gaming regulation. However, under IGRA, states re-
ceived no regulatory authority over class I and class II gaming and could
only acquire regulatory authority over class III gaming if the tribe consented
in a gaming compact. Ironically, given Goldin's position that states would
naturally want more regulatory authority, some states have been uninter-
ested in negotiating for more authority. 2 9 In Michigan, for example, the
State expressly disclaimed regulatory duties over Indian gaming.33 Thus,
the objection ultimately rings hollow.
The "Washington can't tell states what state law means" argument
appears to misread the terms of the secretarial procedure and IGRA. The
argument is also belied by experience. The Secretary has been making-
and will continue to make-determinations of state law in approving class
III compacts. 3 ' The Secretary is now charged with making a determina-
tion of whether a class III compact violates "any provision of [IGRA],"332
which would include a determination that the class III gaming "is located
in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, or-
ganization, or entity . . . ."I" Thus, IGRA requires the Secretary to make
an interpretation of state law, but this does not mean that the Secretary is
deciding or dictating what the state law is.
334
As for the Secretary's alleged conflict of interest, the final version of
the secretarial procedure eliminated the requirement that the Secretary
take over the federal court's job of determining whether a state had failed
to negotiate in good faith. 335 Instead, the Secretary would proceed without
making that determination at all. As for the possibility that the Secretary
would propose procedures that benefited its trustee to the detriment of the
states, one need only consider the Cobell v. Norton litigation, 336 the letter
was to "limit the proliferation of casinos"), aff'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004).
329 See generally RAND & LIGHT, supra note 147 at 117 (noting that state regulation of
tribal gaming varies).
330 E.g., A Compact Between the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indi-
ans and the State of Michigan Providing for the Conduct of Tribal Class III Gaming by the
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians § 8 (1993) (providing that the fol-
lowing notice be placed in every tribal casino: "THIS FACILITY IS NOT REGULATED
BY THE STATE OF MICHIGAN"), available at http://www.michigan.govldocuments/
GTBCompact_70613_7.pdf.
131 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B)(i) (2000).
332 Id.
333 Id. § 271 0(d)(l)(B).
334 See, e.g., Joint Letter from Hon. Theodore R. Kulongowski, Governor, State of Or.,
and Ron Suppah, Chairman, Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Or., 1-2
(May 12, 2005) [hereinafter Kulongowski & Suppah Letter] (on file with author) (noting
that the Secretary asked the State of Oregon and the Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation for the legal basis to conduct class III gaming in Oregon, to which the
parties responded).
315 See generally 25 C.FR. Part 291.336 See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("The Interior Depart-
ment has failed to discharge the fiduciary duties it owes to [Individual Indian Money trust
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from Secretary Norton expressing discomfort at expanding Indian gam-
ing,337 the fact that there has been a vacancy in the post of Assistant Sec-
retary for Indian Affairs for much of the George W. Bush Administration,33 s
or the difficulty that Indian tribes have in convincing the Secretary to
exercise her discretion to take land into trust33 9 to realize that a legally con-
flicted Secretary of the Interior is not a serious concern here.
Finally, the argument that the procedure would discourage tribes
from negotiating with states is also answered by this proposal. The reve-
nue sharing elements of the proposal create bargaining points for both
tribes and states in negotiations over class III gaming compacts. Ratify-
ing the secretarial procedure would simply prevent the negotiations from
being completely open-ended. Additionally, by expanding revenue shar-
ing with local units of government, the proposal facilitates expanded nego-
tiation with local units of government over the provision of governmental
services and encourages broader state agreements, such as omnibus tax
agreements. Equalizing bargaining power expands the opportunities for
intergovernmental agreement beyond gaming.340 Goldin's crabbed view of
tribal and state policymakers is belied by the reality of increasing tribal-state
cooperation in ever-expanding areas of governance.3 41
3. The "Problem" of Off-Reservation Gaming
While off-reservation gaming and "reservation shopping" dominate
the national discussion of Indian gaming law and policy, these issues are
minor in comparison to the real problems faced by tribes, states, local
governments, and the federal government as a result of IGRA's imbal-
ance. As mentioned earlier, the opportunities for off-reservation gaming
and "reservation shopping" are foreclosed to all but a few tribes, and even
those tribes have extraordinary difficulty in opening new gaming opera-
tions. George Skibine recently testified about the hurdles a tribe must clear
account] beneficiaries for decades.").
33 See Norton Letter, supra note 169.
338 See Sen. Johnson Meets with Bureau of Indian Affairs Nominee, U.S. FED. NEWS,
Sept. 13, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15938122 ("The assistant Secretary position to
which Mr. Artman is nominated has been vacant for the past 18 months following the de-
parture of Dave Anderson. 'It's been nearly two years since someone has held this post-
far too long. We need someone in place that will keep the lines of communication open and
consult with our tribes,' Johnson said.").
339 See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, BIA's Efforts to Impose Time Frames
and Collect Better Data Should Improve the Processing of Land in Trust Applications,
GAO-06-781, at 46-49 (July 2006) (listing dozens of non-gaming-related fee-to-trust ap-
plications in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs took more than a year to process).
140 See Brief of Non-Federal Appellees 10 n.6, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v.
Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
341 See generally National Congress of American Indians, Tribal-State Relations,
http://www.ncai.org/State-Tribal-Relations.92.0.html (last visited December 7, 2005) (provid-
ing links to numerous agreements between Indian tribes and states and local governments).
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before it can start gaming off its reservation.3 4' First, it must convince the
Secretary to take land into trust.3 43 Second, it must satisfy one of the statu-
tory exceptions to the general prohibition of gaming on lands acquired
after the enactment of IGRA in 1988. 3' Mr. Skibine testified that "[s]ince
1988, the Secretary has approved 26 trust acquisitions for gaming that
have qualified under the ... exceptions. . . ."I" He also testified that the
Secretary's approval does not necessarily mean that the land has actually
been taken into trust: "[f]or instance, the existence of liens or other en-
cumbrances, or litigation challenging the Secretary's decision may delay
the proposed trust acquisition, often for years. '3 4
6
Despite the fact that few tribes have been able to benefit from the ex-
ceptions to the ban on gaming on after-acquired lands, Senator McCain re-
cently proposed to eliminate one of the exceptions, alleging that there are
"unscrupulous developers seeking to profit off Indian tribes" and that a
stronger prohibition would "discourage attempts by creative non-Indian
developers to turn a tribe's legal rights into a form of extortion." 141 Simi-
larly, former Representative Rick Pombo recently proposed a draft bill that
would re-write Section 2719(b) to require gubernatorial concurrence for
all off-reservation gaming proposals.3 48 These proposals may be effective
in quelling the backlash against off-reservation gaming and "reservation
shopping," but they do little or nothing to quell the real threats to Indian
gaming.
Mr. Skibine's testimony that the Secretary agrees to take off-reservation
lands into trust only after a tribe has passed two high hurdles belies the
need for such a change in IGRA. Off-reservation gaming is simply not a
critical problem in the way that revenue sharing agreements are.
C. Ameliorating the Backlash?
This Article's legislative proposal goes a long way toward undermin-
ing the arguments made against Indian gaming by opponents, both politi-
cal and ideological. Professors Light and Rand have shown, in their dis-
cussion of popular culture, how mainstream American society misunder-
342 See Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on Section 20 of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 109th Cong. 225-33 (2005) (prepared statement of George
T. Skibine), Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs for Policy and Economic
Development, Department of the Interior.) [hereinafter George Skibine July Testimony].
141 See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000); George Skibine July Testimony, supra note 342, at 1.
344 See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) & (b) (2000); George Skibine July Testimony, supra note
342, at 1-2 (identifying five effective exceptions contained within the statute).
341 George Skibine July Testimony, supra note 342, at 2.
346Id. at 3.347 See 151 CONG. REC. S13389-90 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
348 A Bill to Amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to Restrict Off-Reservation
Gaming, and For Other Purposes, H.R., 109th Cong. § I (Discussion Draft 2005).
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stands and misconstrues Indian gaming.3 49 Many non-Indians believe that
Indian tribes stumbled across a way to acquire massive wealth at the ex-
pense of non-Indians through loopholes in federal Indian law,350 that
many tribes are as wealthy and greedy as the worst Mafioso,35" ' and that gam-
ing tribes are no more "Indian" than non-Indians.352 These beliefs demon-
strate how many non-Indians are susceptible to what Reinhold Niebuhr
called "emotionally potent oversimplification" '353 when it comes to Indian
gaming. It is unfortunate but true that non-Indians without an educational
background in Indian culture, history, and law are more apt to believe
and respond to newspaper stories about tribal corruption and greed than
they are to stories about tribal self-governance and recovery from centuries
of oppression.3
5 4
149 See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 5, at 1-2 (describing how Indian gaming operations
are depicted in television shows such as The Simpsons, South Park, The Sopranos, and
Malcolm in the Middle); Rand & Light Testimony, supra note 6, at 7 ("Indian gaming and
'casino Indian' imagery have become a phenomenon widely visible in popular culture, the
mass media, and the discourse used by public policymakers.").
350 See, e.g., Jorg Blech, The Benefits of Becoming Indian, DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 16, 2006,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/Spiegel/0, 1518,395703,00.html (describing Indian
gaming as occurring through a "loophole"); Carolyn Jones, Legislator Seeks State Probe of
Casino's Bingo Machines, S.F. CIIRON., Sept. 6, 2005, at B3, available at 2005 WLNR
14089440 (referring to tribes that use class II technological aids as exploiting a loophole);
Rick Aim, Point, Counterpoint: Let Kansas Voters Decide, KAN. CITY STAR (MO.), July 12,
2005, at D17, available at 2005 WLNR 22828732 (asserting that Kansas tribes, in their
attempts to begin off-reservation gaming operations, are exploiting a loophole); William E.
Schmidt, Bingo Boom Brings Tribes Profit and Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1983, at Al,
available at 1983 WLNR 499339 ("[Tlhe multimillion-dollar boom in bingo has increas-
ingly brought the Indians into direct conflict with a variety of law-enforcement agencies
off the reservation. The authorities say the tribes are taking advantage of loopholes in state
and Federal law to run unregulated gambling operations.").
351 E.g., CRAMER, CASH, supra note 152, at 105 (describing the phenomenon of "Rich
Indian Racism"); Rand & Light Testimony, supra note 6, at 7 ("Somewhat incongruously,
[tribal governments] are accused of being too naive or inexperienced to realize their own
best interests, easily corruptible, guilty of seeking to influence the political system to their
own benefit, and out for 'revenge."'); Matt Assad, One City's Jackpot is Neighbor's Bust;
Decade of Casinos Shows Host Town in Iowa Reaps Benefits but Region Shares in Gam-
bling's Woes, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL (Pa.), Nov. 6, 2005, at A], available at 2005
WLNR 18002139 ("'That's what they do,' said Pat Loontjer, who directs an Omaha-based
group, whose members include the likes of Warren Buffett, that has worked to keep gam-
bling out of Nebraska. 'They get their foot in the door by claiming it's family entertain-
ment, and then they expand, expand and expand to feed their greed."').
352 See CRAMER, CASH, supra note 152, at 105-07.
See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS
AND POLITICS xv (1932) (Charles Scribner's Sons ed. 1952) ("Contending factions in a
social struggle require morale; and morale is created by the right dogmas, symbols and
emotionally potent oversimplifications.").
114 Cf. Rand & Light Testimony, supra note 6, at 9 ("Sovereignty, in the minds of many
Americans, simply means unearned money for tribal members."); Memorandum from John
G. Roberts to Fred R. Fielding I (Nov. 30, 1983) (on file with author) (referring to a bill
restoring lands to the Las Vegas Paiute tribe and asserting that "[tlhis bill essentially does
nothing more than take money from you, me, and everyone else and give it to 143 people
in Nevada (about $10,000 each), simply because they want it.").
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Indian tribes thus lose in the media. In the arena of Indian gaming,
non-Indian politicians and anti-Indian business interests, both having
ready access to major news outlets, exploit tribes' vulnerability to "emo-
tionally potent oversimplification" to generate non-Indian backlash against
gaming whenever it suits them.355 The most recent manifestation of this
phenomenon is in the area of off-reservation gaming. Tribes, often with
the encouragement and political and financial backing of states, local gov-
ernments, or gaming development interests, have begun to seek off-reserva-
tion gaming markets in urban areas where tribal governmental and juris-
dictional presence often is minimal. For example, the City of Rohnert Park
in California agreed with the Graton Rancheria to work together to de-
velop a gaming operation on land west of the city.356 The agreement was
summarized as follows by the California Court of Appeals:
In October of 2003, the Tribe and the City entered into a lengthy
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). It provided that the Tribe
intended to submit an application to the Secretary of the Interior
requesting the United States to take title to the property in trust
for the Tribe, and make a determination that the land shall be
eligible for gaming under the IGRA. The MOU recited that the
Tribe wished to enter into a voluntary contractual arrangement
with the City to make contributions and community investments
to mitigate impacts of the casino project. The MOU provided
for payments of over $200 million to the City over 20 years....
It also provided for termination of the MOU if the land was not
accepted in trust for the Tribe or if the tribal-state compact was
terminated.357
Although this agreement is arguably what anti-Indian gaming oppo-
nents would consider a best case scenario for off-reservation gaming, rather
than lauding their city for reaching an agreement likely to create millions
of dollars in additional revenue for both governments, some citizens urged
rejection of the plan. 358 Again, there were news reports describing the pro-
posal in emotional terms like "backlash,' 350 hyping reports of corruption
355 Cf, Cramer, supra note 70, at 598 (noting that "[t]he availability of gaming financing
for petitioning groups leads to gross oversimplifications about acknowledgment.").
356 See Worthington v. City Council of City of Rohnert Park, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 61
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
157 Id. at 63.
358 See Worthington, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64 ("We emphasize that the issues to be deter-
mined in this appeal do not concern the wisdom of allowing Indian gaming in or near Cali-
fornia cities or the advisability and ramifications of building a casino and resort complex at
the designated location in Sonoma County. These actions undeniably raise emotional is-
sues that have resulted in heated debate and political action throughout the state.") (citation
omitted).
119 See Jim Doyle, Backlash on Betting: Californians Have Second Thoughts About
Gambling, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 24, 2004, at El, available at 2004 WLNR 7628993 ("Four
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by gaming developers,360 and capturing readers' attentions with headlines
such as "Gambling, Gambling Everywhere.
3 6
Similarly, consider the attempt by the Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation and the State of Oregon to seek the Secretary of the
Interior's approval of a class III gaming compact on off-reservation lands.3 61
The Warm Springs tribes already had land in trust near a lucrative gam-
ing market, but it was "heavily timbered and sloped land, [was] within
the boundaries of the Columbia River National Scenic Area, and [had] not
been logged or used for other commercial purposes. 3 63 Rather than exer-
cising their right to open a gaming operation on that land, the Tribes en-
gaged in rigorous compact negotiations with the State that ultimately pro-
duced an agreement on a tract that was acceptable to both parties.3" De-
spite the fact that the Tribes and the Governor negotiated over the stick-
ing points and reached a decision that protected vast swathes of undevel-
oped land, the majority of mass media outlets assailed the proposal. One
newspaper article depicted the Warm Springs community as more politi-
cally powerful than "mining, textile, and environmental groups. 3 65 An edito-
rial opposed to the proposal predicted with over-the-top sarcasm that its
approval would signal a slippery slope of tribal casinos in the area.3 66
This hype attracts Congressional attention, but the attention is mis-
guided. Senator Feinstein's testimony that twenty more tribes are seeking
to open off-reservation gaming operations in California367 ignores a criti-
cal factor-the Secretary of the Interior is not approving any gaming com-
pacts where the land is not already in trust, a requirement necessary for
years after California voters gave the green light to Nevada-style casinos on Indian land,
signs of a backlash are forming. Some question whether we're barreling too hard and too
fast down the one-lane blacktop to Las Vegas.").
360 See Jim Doyle, Vegas Firm With a History of Fines Has Big Plans for Indian Casi-
nos, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 4821406.
361 Editorial, Gambling, Gambling Everywhere, S.F. CHRON., May 30, 2004, at E4,
available at 2004 WLNR 7642222.
362 See generally Cason Letter, supra note 215; Kulongowski & Suppah Letter, supra
note 334.
363 Kulongowski & Suppah Letter, supra note 334, at 5.
364 See id. at 1 ("The Compact represents good faith compromises reached after long
and productive negotiations between the parties."); id. at 5 ("IT]he Governor has indicated
his intention to concur in the taking into trust for gaming purposes ... land not currently
held in trust.").
361 Jeff Kosseff, Tribes Buy Into Political Process, OREGONIAN (PORTLAND), May 9,
2005, at A01, available at 2005 WLNR 7337479.
366 See Editorial, Opinion-In Our View: Make No Gorge Deal; Oregon Governor
Should Take a Stand: No Tribal Casinos on Nontribal Land, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver,
Wash.), May 29, 2005, at C, available at 2004 WLNR 11724314 ("[If Oregon Gov. Ted
Kulongowski allows the Warm Springs Indians to put a casino on nontribal land at Cascade
Locks, Ore., the Yakama Indians could seek to build a casino on the Washington side. Then
the Umatillas and the Nez Perce could join the fun with requests to build casinos along
Interstate 84. Think of the marketing possibilities: 'Casinos in the Scenic Area'[;] 'Gam-
bling in the Gorge' [;] 'Four Places to Make a Fortune between Beacon Rock and Biggs."').
361 See Feinstein Testimony, supra note 202, at 6.
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these proposals to take effect.368 And since the Department has approved
few such trust acquisitions,369 and all of those approved required guberna-
torial concurrence,3"' the argument rings hollow in terms of on-the-ground
reality. But, sadly, the fact that off-reservation gaming is even a legal possi-
bility is enough to provoke a national backlash.37
This proposal eliminates many of the political and economic factors
that drive Indian tribes to pursue off-reservation gaming. However, many
federally recognized tribes still have no land base, while other, unrecog-
nized, tribes may someday achieve federal recognition. IGRA contemplates
that both classes of tribes be allowed to open gaming operations on trust
lands under IGRA's exceptions. By definition, these lands are called "off-
reservation" lands and their use for Indian gaming will be subject to harsh
media scrutiny. Although this proposal goes a long way toward reducing
the need for off-reservation gaming, it is unlikely to wholly eliminate the
backlash.
V. CONCLUSION
Senator McCain's exasperated comments at the time of the enact-
ment of IGRA deserve the attention of the tribes.372 This Article argues
that the congressional agenda, including former Representative Pombo's
draft bill on off-reservation gaming, is a response that does not focus on
the critical issue: the unbalanced bargaining power of tribes and states in
a post-Seminole Tribe world, which leads to one-sided revenue sharing
agreements that may or may not be illegal under IGRA. Off-reservation
gaming is a red herring. The origin of off-reservation gaming and reser-
vation shopping is the imbalance in IGRA.
This Article argues that a legislative package to ratify and authorize
revenue sharing, restore the balance of IGRA moving forward, and clar-
ify the law on class II technologic aids would alleviate the major prob-
lems in IGRA resulting from the Seminole Tribe decision. While Semi-
nole Tribe might have looked like a major victory for states in 1996, it
368 See James P. Sweeney, Off-reservation Gambling Limited by Interior Policy, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 30, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 8666297 ("The [De-
partment of the Interior] will no longer consider gambling agreements for sites that are not
Indian lands held in trust for a tribe by the federal government .... "); Cason Letter, supra
note 215, at 2 ("Only after the Tribes have acquired the Cascade Locks Land into trust,
will the Department consider the terms and conditions of a timely submitted compact pur-
suant to the applicable provisions of IGRA.").
369 See George Skibine November Testimony, supra note 215, at 2.
370 See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000).
- See 151 CONG. REC. S13389-90 (daily ed., Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. Mc-
Cain).
372 Senator McCain's most recent proposal would "eliminat[e] the authority of the Sec-
retary to take land into trust off-reservation pursuant to the so-called 'two-part determina-
tion' provisions of Section [2719(b)(1)(A)]." Id. at S 13390.
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ultimately could be the undoing of a once carefully balanced Indian gam-
ing structure.
One aspect of the Indian gaming debate that gets little national ex-
posure is the reality that many state and local governments now depend
on Indian gaming revenues. Congress may have intended for IGRA to bene-
fit tribes, but Seminole Tribe changed the law in a manner that allowed
state and local governments to benefit from Indian gaming as well. Per-
haps, then, the current imbalance in IGRA will actually have provided a
unique opportunity to strengthen the law and policy of Indian gaming for
the long term. But to turn that opportunity into a reality, Congress must re-
balance IGRA to benefit tribes and state and local governments.
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